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ABSTRACT 
The 2010s saw a revolution in the space industry leading to the commercial 
proliferation of space technologies once reserved for national space programs and 
militaries, dubbed by many as Space 2.0. This rapid rebalancing of capabilities from 
traditional state actors to commercial entities contributed to a reevaluation of U.S. space 
institutions and practices resulting in an increased U.S. military reliance on commercial 
entities to build space capability, capacity, and resilience. To that end, there is renewed 
interest in discerning the impacts of this expanded commercial space reliance on current 
U.S. military doctrine, thus placing new demands on the practice of wargaming among 
the U.S. military services. Specifically, wargaming must now account for this increased 
reliance by establishing guiding principles and wargaming methodologies to properly 
account for this revolution in space-based capabilities. This thesis addresses this problem 
by sampling the scope of commercial space capabilities, evaluating governing policy and 
doctrine, and examining a representative sample of the U.S. military's reliance on 
commercial space. The unique qualities of commercial space are evaluated to identify a 
list of guiding principles for wargaming applications. Then, wargaming methodologies 
that encompass these guiding principles are identified and proposed. Finally, these 
principles are applied to the USMC’s Assassin’s Mace wargame to demonstrate and 
evaluate their utility and application.
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Recent advancements in the commercial space industry have significantly 
rebalanced the historical ratios of state-owned to commercially owned space-based 
capabilities and capacity [1]. In recognition of this shift in the space landscape, it is now 
explicit Department of Defense (DOD) strategy to leverage commercial space to augment 
capacity and build resiliency [2]. Therefore, the DOD must establish principled methods 
for incorporating this reliance on commercial space partners into its wargaming practices. 
This research sought to address this need by deducing guiding principles and wargaming 
methodologies that facilitate the inclusion of the DOD’s reliance on commercial SATCOM 
and commercial space-based ISR partners into its wargaming efforts.  
This research first surveyed the scope of commercial SATCOM and commercial 
space-based ISR capabilities to exhibit their relative features, capability, and relevancy to 
the modern battlefield. Then, this thesis reviewed the historical relations between the U.S. 
Government (USG) and the commercial SATCOM and ISR industries. Finally, this survey 
of historical context concluded with an introduction to current DOD contracting of 
commercial SATCOM and commercial space-based ISR that showed the growth of this 
now-robust relationship and dependency. 
With the collective regulatory and policy context examined, commercial space 
partners were shown to face uniquely commercial challenges during times of conflict that 
reflect the commercial paradigm defined by relations with customers, relations with 
regulators, their current business model, and their future commercial viability. 
From this paradigm, this thesis showed how these commercial considerations could 
be leveraged to influence a commercial space partner’s ability or willingness to support the 
DOD during times of conflict. This research then summarized the results of this analysis 
into a set of six guiding principles as follows: 
1. Assets may hold strategic value to commercial partners  
2. Market access cannot be assumed and may be leveraged 
3. Current and future profitability must be protected 
xvi 
4. Stakeholders must be known and accounted for 
5. The existence of undisclosed influence must be acknowledged 
6. Proliferation complicates capability denial 
Once this research established the commercial paradigm and guiding principles, it 
then introduced the craft of wargaming and, more specifically, DOD wargaming efforts. 
From this context, this thesis determined that the recommended incorporation methods 
should be structured for application to analytic wargames. Then, the commercial paradigm 
and guiding principles were synthesized into recommended changes to wargame constructs 
and gameplay mechanics. Specifically, wargames including this dependency should ensure 
representation, improve player orientation, and increase relative proliferation into the game 
construct. Then, to improve gameplay modeling, wargame designs should incorporate the 
commercial paradigm and the guiding principles into game interactions between players. 
Moreover, wargame designs should incorporate the relative resiliencies and susceptibilities 
of commercial space assets and capabilities into their modeling of space-enabled 
capabilities. Decision aids were created for each of the previous recommendations. 
Finally, this thesis evaluated the effectiveness of these recommendations by 
applying them to the Marine Corps analytic wargame, Assassin’s Mace, as part of a 
sponsored wargame conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School. This application 
demonstrated how each of the wargame inject methods could be applied to an existing 
DOD analytic wargame in pursuit of a known wargame objective with associated key 
issues. The results included the explicit representation of space-based ISR and the 
delineation between commercial and national theater ISR capabilities. Additionally, their 
relative resiliency and proliferation were incorporated. Finally, commercial SATCOM was 
included as a means of redundant command and control with the caveat that its utilization 
includes some additional susceptibility to communication exploitation. Ultimately, this 
process revealed that the developed tools are well suited for modeling DOD reliance on 
commercial space partners in analytical wargames, but many of the modeling 
recommendations are not easily applied to existing games without also requiring extensive 
remodeling of the space domain if not already included.  
xvii 
Overall, the thesis successfully established guiding principles and wargaming 
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The first part of the twenty-first century witnessed a growth in the commercial 
space industry on a scale and at a pace not previously seen in the nearly 70 years since the 
space age began. For the first time, commercially owned and operated space capabilities 
and capacity grew to rival all but the most technologically advanced government systems. 
Moreover, commercial space operators now represent a diversity of nations and interests 
vastly exceeding the short list of traditional nation-state space-programs seen in the 
decades prior [1]. Thus, this new space age is rightly called “Space 2.0” by those aware of 
this rapid growth in space actors and capabilities that, collectively, represent the first major 
space race since the original 1960s race to the moon [2]. However, this exciting growth 
also brought with it a new array of challenges for civil and military policymakers, a reality 
acknowledged by the 2020 U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) Space Strategy Summary:  
Rapid increases in commercial and international space activities worldwide 
add to the complexity of the space environment. Commercial space 
activities provide national and homeland security benefits with new 
technologies and services and create new economic opportunities in 
established and emerging markets. The same activities, however, also create 
challenges in protecting critical technology, ensuring operational security, 
and maintaining strategic advantages. [3] 
In short, this rapid growth in commercial space capabilities played a significant role 
in the re-evaluation of the U.S. space security construct which included the re-
establishment of U.S. Space Command, creation of the U.S. Space Force (USSF) in 2019, 
and the designation of space as a warfighting domain [3]. By extension, this reevaluation 
of U.S. space institutions and the space domain also brought with it an official recognition 
that space is now “contested,” “congested,” and “competitive” with numerous nationalities, 
companies, capabilities, interests, and customers competing in a complex environment [4]. 
Moreover, the space environment is no longer purely sculpted by the actions, policies, and 
interests of major state actors, namely the United States and Russia, despite intentional 
efforts by U.S. space policy to ensure it remains a “free and open domain” [5], [6]. Finally, 
as commercial capabilities have grown, so too has U.S. military reliance on this “free and 
open domain” and commercial space partners for services ranging from mobile satellite 
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communications to theater broadband internet, remote sensing to signals intelligence [7], 
[8]. Thus, the inclusion of this pervasive and growing reliance on commercial space 
partners into the U.S. strategic thinking is an imperative.  
Therefore, the DOD must incorporate this new reality of reliance on commercial 
space partners into its plans, policy, and doctrine, which, in turn, demands increased 
incorporation of this reliance into the DOD’s space-related wargaming. Unfortunately, 
despite the increased incorporation of space into DOD wargaming over the past decade, 
commercial space reliance remains largely absent from most wargaming efforts within the 
DOD [9]. Furthermore, there is no apparent uniformity among the wargaming 
methodologies used by the DOD to incorporate commercial space actions and effects, 
which, in turn, obfuscates insights that might otherwise be drawn from DOD space-related 
wargames [9]. Therefore, to analyze the strategic, operational, and tactical implications of 
relying on commercial space, the DOD must address this lack of structure by establishing 
uniform guiding principles and methodologies for the inclusion of this new, growing, and 
constantly changing facet of national security: commercial space reliance.  
A. PURPOSE 
This thesis addresses the challenge of wargaming DOD’s reliance on commercial 
space partners to facilitate greater incorporation of this reliance into future DOD 
wargaming efforts. This research distills guiding principles and develops wargaming 
methodologies that apply across a wide range of DOD wargaming scenarios. For the 
purposes of this research, wargaming refers specifically to the act of evaluating scenarios 
as well as competing forces and their decisions through their representation by human 
players with a focus on interactions, consequences, and implications [10]. This thesis treats 
wargaming as distinct from modeling and simulation’s evaluation of technical and physical 
interactions.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis’ primary research question is: which overarching guiding principles and 
wargaming methodologies best enable the sound and equitable inclusion of commercial 
space-based satellite communication (SATCOM) and intelligence, surveillance, and 
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reconnaissance (ISR) into the spectrum of DOD analytical wargaming efforts? This thesis 
answers this question by addressing the following subsidiary research questions: 
1. What is the relevant scope of commercial space-based ISR and SATCOM 
that warrants inclusion into DOD wargaming based upon its demonstrated 
military applications and current utilization by the DOD? 
2. What is the policy, doctrine, and regulatory context of current DOD 
reliance on commercial space-based ISR and SATCOM partners? 
3. How is the perspective of a DOD-contracted commercial space partner 
unique from the perspective of DOD decision-makers in times of conflict 
due to uniquely commercial considerations? 
4. What guiding principles can be deduced from an understanding of the 
commercial paradigm and their partnership with the DOD during times of 
conflict? 
5. What wargaming methodologies should be employed by DOD wargamers 
to incorporate the full scope of guiding principles while remaining usable 
to a broad range of DOD wargaming practitioners? 
C. SCOPE 
This thesis limits its analysis to developed applications of commercially owned and 
operated space capabilities that have direct bearing on military operations. This thesis also 
constrains its analysis of U.S. DOD wargaming efforts to those routinely incorporating 
dependencies on space, and it does not include efforts to model or simulate space 
interactions separate from the distinct discipline of wargaming. Lastly, the thesis constrains 
its recommended wargaming methodologies to a rules- and turns-based approach that can 
be executed manually or with minimal programming requirements. Moreover, the 
methodologies do not seek to account for the extreme range of commercial space reliance 
considerations, but rather they enable evaluation of likely conflict scenarios faced by 
wargaming practitioners. 
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D. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
After this introduction, Chapter II provides an overview of past and present 
commercial space technologies, their uses, and their application to the modern battlefield. 
Chapter II concludes with a selection and summary of commercial SATCOM and remote 
sensing constellations that the DOD should include in its wargames to adequately represent 
its current dependencies. Chapter III reviews the scope of U.S. and DOD policy concerning 
commercial space, current relations to the commercial space industry, and current formal 
utilization of commercial systems by the DOD. This review justifies the assertion that 
DOD’s commercial space partners already play a vital role in the U.S. security construct. 
This, in turn, justifies increased inclusion of commercial space partners into DOD 
wargaming initiatives. Chapter IV provides an overview of the space domain and space 
conflict, highlighting the unique challenges faced by commercial space operators compared 
to government-owned and -operated military satellites. Furthermore, Chapter IV evaluates 
the unique paradigm of commercial space actors within the context of space warfare and 
identifies the resulting forms of internal and external influence faced by commercial actors. 
Chapter IV concludes with the enumeration of the following six guiding principles: 
1. Assets may hold strategic value to commercial partners  
2. Market access cannot be assumed and may be leveraged 
3. Current and future profitability must be protected 
4. Company stakeholders must be known and accounted for  
5. The existence of undisclosed influence must be acknowledged 
6. Proliferation complicates capability denial 
Chapter V translates the principles from Chapter IV into a set of wargaming 
methodologies that enable the application of these principles across a broad range of DOD 
analytic wargaming initiatives. Specifically, Chapter V recommends future wargames 
include greater commercial space partner representation, increased proliferation, and 
greater player orientation. Moreover, Chapter V recommends future wargames utilize a 
“closed” wargame setting where player interactions are limited to reflect directed 
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communications and limited battlespace awareness for commercial actors. Finally, Chapter 
V recommends that actions against government-operated military satellites and 
commercial satellites should not be treated as equal given the disparity in their designs and 
protective measures.  
Chapter VI summarizes the results of a wargame conducted at the Naval 
Postgraduate School utilizing the proposed methodologies to demonstrate the utility of the 
guiding principles and methodologies. Finally, Chapter VII summarizes the research’s 
conclusions and recommends future areas of research to include improved standardization 
of player orientation and education. Additionally, it recommends further effort be made to 
identify and standardize theater- and service-specific space considerations to better align 
wargaming objectives and key issues with service-specific requirements. 
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II. COMMERCIAL SPACE CAPABILITIES 
To better define the impact of “Space 2.0” on wargames incorporating commercial 
space reliance, this growth in commercial space capabilities must first be surveyed to 
highlight pertinent technological advances in the commercial space industry that should be 
incorporated into DOD wargaming initiatives. Many efforts have already been made to 
capture the scope of these changes into single studies, books, and other resources. Notable 
public examples include the Space Foundation’s annual “Space Report” and the Satellite 
Industry Associations annual report [11], [12]. However, a complete review of modern 
commercial space capabilities exceeds the scope of this thesis; instead, this chapter first 
provides the most pertinent highlights of the histories of commercial SATCOM and ISR 
that, together, demonstrate the commercial space industry’s close relationship with the U.S. 
government (USG). Then, representative samples of current commercial satellite 
constellations are provided that exemplify those constellations and capabilities that have 
the greatest relevance to the modern battlefield and by extension, DOD wargaming. 
A. HISTORY OF THE COMMERCIAL SPACE INDUSTRY AND 
CAPABILITIES 
Despite the rapid growth in commercial space capabilities of the early twenty-first 
century, commercial space enterprises are not a new phenomenon, especially in light of 
their extensive history dating back to the 1960s. In fact, commercial space efforts led the 
way in some instances, preceding even national systems and capabilities since the dawn of 
space-enabled communications and remote sensing [13]. Thus, this overview begins with 
an introduction to the history of commercial satellite communications starting in 1962 
followed by an introduction to commercial remote sensing to help contextualize both the 
capabilities and the historical availability of these commercial systems. 
The history of commercial SATCOM begins with the first commercially 
developed, funded, and operated communications satellite program, AT&T Bell’s Telstar 
communications satellite program [14]. This program made history as the “first privately 
sponsored space-faring mission” when it was launched in July, 1962 [14]. Shortly 
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thereafter, Hughes Space and Telecommunications launched its Syncom satellites, thus 
“pioneer [ing] geosynchronous communication satellite design” [13]. However, 
recognizing the strategic impact of the nascent commercial satellite communication 
industry and the need for standardization, the USG quickly regulated the satellite 
communication industry starting with the 1962 Communications Satellite Act. This act 
effectively regulated ownership-of and access-to commercial satellites and their services 
through the creation of the “public-private entit [ies],” Communications Satellite 
Corporation (COMSAT) and the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization 
(INTELSAT), which were both conglomerations of commercial satellite companies and 
federal programs [13], [15]. The creation of these organizations staved off the creation of 
a purely commercial monopoly within the commercial space communication industry, and 
it also enabled the regulation and standardization of then-current and future commercial 
satellite communication (SATCOM) systems. However, the unintended consequence was 
that commercial SATCOM regulations stymied growth throughout the following three 
decades [13]. This was further exacerbated by the lack of commercial space launch 
providers given that only national space programs could launch satellites into orbit at that 
time. Specifically, it was not until the foundation of the publicly held French launch 
provider Arianespace SA that commercial companies had access to launch capabilities not 
held and, by extension, controlled by nation-state space programs [16]. Thus, in summary, 
commercial satellite communication efforts walked in step with national space program 
directions with little leeway until the 1980s and 1990s. However, this trend did not 
continue, and was upended by a series of changes that, together, brought about a more 
robust commercial SATCOM industry in the decades to follow. 
First, the late 1980s saw growth in mobile communications for applications in the 
maritime and aviation industry, along with the necessary miniaturization of digital 
hardware, that brought new demand for the commercial SATCOM industry [13]. Second, 
launch costs were simultaneously reduced due a variety of factors including the 1984 
Commercial Space Launch Act and competition from European government launch 
providers [13]. Thus, although not accomplished through any other means than the 
persistent increase in demand, technological improvements, and supportive U.S. 
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commercial space policies that encouraged growth, the U.S. commercial space industry 
grew continuously through the 1990s and 2000s. In fact, the U.S. commercial space 
industry is, as of 2018, a $158 billion industry representing over half of the global 
commercial space market and almost four times the size of the USG’s space budget [17], 
[18]. However, this restricted beginning followed by significant growth is also evident 
in the important commercial remote sensing industry, a point also warranting a brief 
summary [11]. 
Although remote sensing and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 
by satellites was developed at the onset of the space age, it did not transition to a 
commercial industry until the passing of the 1984 Land Remote Sensing 
Commercialization Act. Recognizing the value of satellite remote sensing and the stifling 
effect on industry caused by a lack of clear policy, the United States enacted a series of 
policy changes clearing the way for “the [commercialization of] remote-sensing functions 
relating to private sector operations,” and the preservation of “the right to acquire and 
disseminate digital remote-sensing data” [19]. Thus, through the signing of an initial policy 
in 1984 and a revised version of the remote sensing national policy in 1992, the United 
States paved the way for a rapidly expanding U.S. commercial remote sensing industry that 
saw its first significant privatization efforts occurring shortly thereafter [20]. Specifically, 
the U.S. government attempted to commercialize the U.S. Landsat program through the 
late 1980s, and, although ultimately failing to remain economically viable, it ushered in a 
new era of commercial investment into the new industry [20]. However, this growth was 
not isolated to the United States.  
Concurrent with these efforts in the United States, the French Satellite Pour 
l’Observation de la Terre (SPOT) program of 1982 also represents another example of this 
transition. The SPOT program was designed from the outset as a joint government-
commercial venture and ultimately resulted in the creation of SPOT IMAGE Corporation 
in 1986, a commercial vendor of remote sensing data to both government and commercial 
users [21]. In doing so, SPOT IMAGE Corporation became one of the first commercial 
operators of a remote sensing satellite, albeit with the support and leadership of the French 
national space agency [21]. However, the final hurtles remained of achieving a 
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commercially designed, launched, and operated remote sensing satellite, an honor that, 
although pursued by many concurrent efforts in the late 1990s, was effectively captured by 
IKONOS nearly a decade later. 
Space Imaging, now Maxar Technologies, designed IKONOS in response to the 
1992 revision of the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act that fully allowed commercial 
ownership and operation of remote sensing satellites by U.S. companies [20]. With its 
launch in September 1999, IKONOS brought to market the first ever commercially 
available sub-meter resolution imagery [20]. Moreover, IKONOS began a trend of ever-
improving commercial remote sensing capabilities that are now paced by numerous 
competing vendors of sub-0.5 meter imagery that represent the current state of the art 
within the commercial remote sensing industry [22]. In doing so, IKONOS ushered in an 
age where numerous companies from multiple nations now possess the ability to image 
objects as small as vehicles, equipment, and supplies, making these commercial actors and 
their capabilities relevant to the modern battlefield and present over almost any portion of 
the globe multiple times per day. 
Thus, in summary, both commercial remote sensing and commercial satellite 
communications experienced trying and uncertain beginnings underneath the shadow of 
competing national space programs that, to varying degrees and at different times, 
conceded to a growing undercurrent of demand for the commercialization of space. Now, 
current permissive national policies sustain a commercial remote sensing market that is 
highly diverse and competitive, producing services and products that come close to 
matching and, at times, exceeding national systems in both capability and capacity. In light 
of this, it is appropriate to review a sampling these capabilities for perspective and when 
considering their employment on the modern battlefield and the necessity of their inclusion 
in DOD wargaming.  
B. CURRENT COMMERCIAL SPACE TECHNOLOGIES AND THEIR 
POTENTIAL APPLICATIONS 
To properly wargame commercial space reliance, a baseline of representative 
technologies must first be developed that can be used to represent the most applicable on-
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orbit systems impacting national security. Given that this analysis is inherently focused on 
technologies that have ramifications on battlefield operations, this baseline only presents 
representative technologies from the two most militarily relevant types of commercial 
space technology: communications and remote sensing. 
1. Communications 
Commercial satellite communications have historically been the most ubiquitous 
form of commercial space enterprises, but their capabilities have consistently trailed those 
of terrestrial networks in speed and bandwidth [23]. However, as technology has 
developed, so too has the capacity and capability of these systems. Now commercial 
communication satellites occupy the full spectrum of traditional orbits, and their capacities 
dwarf national systems in both proliferation and throughput [24]. The following three 
satellite constellations each represent a commercial SATCOM constellation in one of the 
three most common orbital regimes. Moreover, in addition to their numerous private users, 
they are also common SATCOM constellation types leveraged by governments seeking to 
complement their national systems. Chapter III covers specific USG reliance. Chapter IV 
reviews the orbits themselves, both their advantages and disadvantages.  
First, IRIDIUM, detailed in Table 1, exemplifies the modern capability to utilize a 
large constellation of dozens of satellites to enable nearly worldwide SATCOM for mobile 
satellite phone users [25]. This constellation is positioned in the low Earth orbit (LEO) 
regime and constituted with 66 medium-sized satellites transiting constantly overhead [25]. 
Constellations like these form the basis for cellphone-like communications coverage for 
numerous mobile users who are not constrained to a geographic location on the ground and 
allow, in some instances, for users to be mobile. 
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Table 1. IRIDIUM Satellite Constellation Overview. Adapted from [25]. 
 
 
Second, Table 2 depicts a medium Earth orbit (MEO) constellation providing high-
capacity data connectivity for primarily fixed-location users on the ground [26]. Examples 
of these users might be fixed command posts, slow moving ships, or other basing. 
Constellations such as these utilize far fewer satellites given that their higher altitude 
enables line-of-sight connectivity with a larger physical region on the ground. To enable 
these higher requirements per spacecraft, each satellite is typically larger, more advanced, 
and more expensive than those seen in LEO constellations.  
Table 2. O3b mPower Satellite Constellation Overview. Adapted from [26]. 
 
 
Finally, ViaSat, a geosynchronous (GEO) SATCOM constellation, represents the 
high-end in both orbital altitude and satellite capacity [27]. These satellites are located at a 
13 
significantly higher altitude than either MEO or LEO constellations, and remain fixed over 
a set location on the ground due to the specific orbital dynamics of their altitude [27]. This 
removes some of the complexity of networking users across multiple satellites throughout 
multiple orbits and allows for larger, more powerful satellites that are custom built for the 
servicing of set geographic locations. This, in turn, lends itself to high-capacity satellites 
with ViaSat owning many of the largest. These satellites service multiple fixed ground 
terminals with bandwidths exceeding many government constellations [24]. The U.S. DOD 
uses these constellations, among others, to supplement national SATCOM capabilities by 
leasing bandwidth from these and other providers.  
Table 3. ViaSat Satellite Constellation Overview. Adapted from [27]. 
 
 
2. Remote Sensing 
Although the sector of commercial remote sensing is extensive and expanding, 
this research only references a single example, Worldview-3, shown in Table 4, which 
represents one of the highest-resolution commercial imaging satellites in orbit. 
Worldview-3 is an optical imagining satellite in LEO capable of capturing images with 
ground sample distances of 0.31 meters, meaning it can distinguish objects separated by as 
little as roughly one foot and is easily sufficient for tactical military applications [28]. This 
specific satellite operates independently, although Maxar Technologies does operate other 
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older Worldview satellites capable of similar resolutions and a fleet of smaller and lower-
resolution satellites providing additional imagery [28]. 
Table 4. Worldview-3 Satellite Overview. Adapted from [28]. 
 
 
Of note, Maxar intends to launch a constellation of LEO satellites called Maxar 
Legion in 2021 that are capable of 0.29 m resolution with, more importantly, up to 15 
overflights of a given region each day [29]. This ability to rapidly image and re-image a 
location on Earth has significant intelligence value that is increasing demand in both the 
commercial and government remote sensing customer bases [29]. Most importantly, 
however, the USG now actively supplements its national ISR capabilities with multiple 
imaging contracts across numerous vendors to meet increased demand as described in 
Chapter III.  
C. SUMMARY 
The commercial SATCOM and ISR industries’ collective history and current 
capabilities both point to the larger trend of continued growth in the commercial space 
industry. More importantly, however, commercial space-based capabilities are no longer 
niche services for a handful of customers. Instead, they represent an already massive and 
growing capability set that are now tactically relevant and heavily relied upon by 
government users and international actors alike. Therefore, the DOD can no longer ignore 
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the effects these capabilities have on the modern battlefield. Thus, commercial actors and 
their systems must be accounted for in DOD wargaming since they collectively now 
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III. REVIEW OF U.S. GOVERNMENT RELATIONS TO THE 
COMMERCIAL SPACE INDUSTRY 
The commercial space industry’s relationship with the U.S. government is as old as 
the industry itself, with a long series of specific interactions, policies, acts, and laws that 
have steadily shaped the formal relationship of the U.S. commercial space industry with 
the U.S. government and, by extension, the DOD. This history provides the framework for 
the predominant pressures and likely courses of actions in the event of conflict in the space 
domain. Thus, this history weighs heavily on any prospective paradigm relating to the 
wargaming of DOD reliance on commercial space partners. Therefore, this chapter 
introduces a brief history of the development of this relationship between the commercial 
space industry and the U.S. government followed by an outline of their current relations 
and engagements. 
A. U.S. COMMERCIAL SPACE POLICY AND DOCTRINE 
As with the historical overview of the development of the commercial space 
industry, the histories of remote sensing and satellite communications policies are 
sufficiently distinct to warrant treating them as two separate accounts within this research. 
Therefore, this introduction starts with the history of U.S. policy for commercial remote 
sensing then addresses historical commercial SATCOM policy. 
1. Historical Context 
As previously referenced, the 1984 Land Remote-Sensing Commercialization Act 
set in motion significant growth within the U.S. commercial remote sensing industry. 
However, it, along with its revision in 1992, also set the tone for the relations between the 
USG and the U.S. commercial remote sensing companies with an overture of explicit 
“promotion” [13]. However, these acts were passed when the best commercial imaging 
capabilities, such as SPOT-1, were still only capable of 10-meter resolution, thus posing 
little plausible risk to military operations or national security [21]. Specifically, there were 
few satellites such as SPOT. This, in turn, resulted in long revisit times on the order of 
days. Moreover, a lack of onboard storage meant their resolution only covered relatively 
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small physical areas, making them of limited use at an operational level [21]. Furthermore, 
dissemination of the imagery could be easily controlled with the internet still in its infancy, 
a lack of commercial systems, and a relatively small market. However, the increasing 
capabilities and the first Gulf War precipitated a significant review of U.S. policy and 
ushered in sweeping changes to these regulations and formal arraignments between the 
USG and commercial remote sensing companies.  
The first major incident prompting new regulations occurred with the onset of the 
first Gulf War. Specifically, as U.S. military planners conducted the buildup to U.S. 
operations in the gulf, it became an increasing concern that commercial ISR products and 
imagery might negate force protection measures and reveal U.S. intentions [30]. The fear 
was that SPOT-1, the French commercially operated ISR satellite, had no formal obligation 
to protect U.S. military or national security interests [30]. Moreover, it was known that Iraq 
had already procured imagery of Kuwait from SPOT prior to its invasion of the country 
[30]. However, with the onset of hostilities, the “French terminated all sale of the Gulf-
related imagery within days of the invasion. Being a commercial venture, the board of 
directors stated their intent to sustain a non-military image” [30]. Thus, despite the benign 
outcome, the USG immediately reviewed its policy on commercial remote sensing leading 
to a sweeping set of changes starting with the National Space Policy Directive 3 (NSPD-
3) of 1991.  
The NSPD-3 furthered USG commitment to promoting the commercial space 
industry through its removal of some restrictions on the USG purchase of commercial space 
products but added that it must be done so “consistent with national security” [31]. Then, 
in 1992, a much larger policy change occurred with the signing of the 1992 Land Remote 
Sensing Policy Act. The 1992 Land Remote Sensing Policy Act established, among other 
things, comprehensive regulation for licensing private remote sensing companies within 
the United States. More specifically, however, it said that “no license shall be granted by 
the Secretary unless the Secretary determines in writing that the applicant will comply with 
international obligations and national security concerns of the United States” [32]. This 
justification was later expounded upon in the form of a Code of Federal Regulation (C.F.R.) 
passed in 2000 known as 15 C.F.R. Part 960, which requires a “licensee to limit data 
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collection and/or distribution by the system during periods when national security or 
international obligations and/or foreign policies may be compromised” [33]. This policy of 
the USG restricting commercial operations of U.S. licensed remote sensing companies is 
now known colloquially as “shutter control” and applies directly to the guiding principles 
proposed in Chapter IV [34]. However, this legal ability to restrict imaging in response to 
national security concerns did not dampen broader U.S. commitment to actively supporting 
the growth of the U.S. commercial space remote sensing industry.  
In 2003, the administration of George W. Bush published the U.S. Commercial 
Remote Sensing Policy, a policy that took a major leap forward in USG support to 
commercial industry while at the same time complicating future conflict scenarios [35]. 
Specifically, this policy stipulated that, more than simply supporting the U.S. commercial 
remote sensing industry through deregulation and investment, the USG would now “rely 
to the maximum practical extent on commercial remote sensing capabilities” [35]. 
Moreover, it formalized the stipulations known as shutter control into broader policy by 
noting that the USG “may require additional controls including limits on use” and 
“communication link protection measures” [35]. In other words, not only would the USG 
support the industry, but the United States would also now pursue a policy of formal 
reliance on commercial products for the execution of official USG operations with the 
understanding that the USG reserved the right to exercise limits on use to protect national 
security. However, this policy did not stand alone in this initiative and has taken root in the 
form of several other policies and initiatives thereafter. 
In 2006, the White House Space Transportation Policy committed the U.S. 
government to “purchas [ing] commercial capabilities and service when they are available 
in the commercial marketplace and meet United States Government requirements” [13]. 
This ultimately echoed the 2003 policy and, in a manner more inwardly directed at USG 
policymakers, maintained the USG commitment to identify new ways to utilize the 
commercial sector. Lastly, the National Space Policy published in 2010 again committed 
“U.S. government departments and agencies…[to] actively explore the use 
of…arrangements for acquiring commercial space goods” [13]. Consequently, efforts such 
as the Commercial Systems Program Office at the National Reconnaissance Office now 
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intentionally incorporate commercial space partners and capabilities to augment USG 
capabilities and use nationally owned systems to, instead, “meet…unique tailored needs” 
[36]. Thus, in short, by 2010, the USG was fully committed to a policy of direct 
procurement of and reliance on the U.S. commercial remote sensing industry for 
unclassified imagery requirements, a reality that, as previously noted, fueled the 
development of an impressive commercial sector, commercial space capabilities, and an 
ever-growing marketplace [37]. However, the above policies do not sufficiently cover USG 
relations with the commercial SATCOM industry, which warrants further discussion.  
In contrast to the history of USG relations to commercial remote sensing 
companies, the history of relations between the USG and commercial SATCOM providers 
is relatively simple.  
Unlike the realm of remote sensing, where U.S. government systems are regarded 
as the world-leader and ISR applications have undeniable direct applications to national 
security, communication via SATCOM represents a more ubiquitous, global, and diverse 
industry with a less-obvious correlation to security issues. Therefore, it should be expected 
that SATCOM evolution is more a response to market demands and less a product of 
directed national policy. For instance, prior to the first Gulf War, there were few official 
policies except the aforementioned policies instructing the USG to promote “to the 
maximum practical extent” the commercial space industry. Instead, oversight was achieved 
through participation in regional/international organizations such as INTELSAT, 
EUTELSAT, and others.1 Specifically, these organizations, comprised of members from 
numerous countries, achieved regulation through consensus and provided services to a 
wide range of customers and governments around the world [38]. Also, this absence of 
direct investment in commercial SATCOM was driven by a relative lack of demand given 
that DOD SATCOM requirements were met almost exclusively by the existing military 
SATCOM constellations launched the decade prior [39]. However, with the onset of 
hostilities, demand for SATCOM skyrocketed and the DOD immediately set up 
 
1 Of note, these organizations would later privatize into singular commercial satellite service providers, 
and their names will refer to the private companies in future references. 
21 
sustainment support from a multitude of commercial vendors to include commercial MSS 
and other fixed commercial satellite communications [38]. Specifically, SATCOM 
providers such as INTELSAT and INMARSAT provided direct support to Naval vessels, 
inter-coalition communication links, and supplemental bandwidth for forward deployed 
commanders. In fact, some estimates place the total commercial SATCOM supply at 50% 
of the total bandwidth used by coalition forces [38]. Thus, in summary, USG policy toward 
commercial SATCOM was that of a customer, interested in supporting an industry that it 
actively participated in and managed through international organizations, for both strategic 
purposes and tactical necessity. However, this boom in USG partnership with commercial 
SATCOM saw a second distinct phase with the end of the first Gulf War.  
The 1990s and 2000s saw another shift in this relationship as the U.S. military 
began seeking “supplemental” commercial SATCOM services after realizing that its 
current military SATCOM systems were not projected to meet even current demand in 
times of conflict [39]. By Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, military SATCOM demand 
grew to nearly twenty times what it was twelve years earlier [39]. A 2003 United States 
Government Accounting Office (GAO) report summarized the state of military use of 
SATCOM by noting that the absence of a strategic structure for procuring necessary 
commercial SATCOM was leading to inefficiencies that necessitated greater intentional 
and strategic procurement of such services [40]. Details aside, the report effectively 
captured the broader reality that the USG was fundamentally a customer working within 
an industry that was not directly managed by explicit USG leadership [40]. Thus, through 
the first two decades of the twenty-first century, the USG was fundamentally in the position 
of a customer in an international marketplace. It was only through the regulation provided 
by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) of commercial SATCOM providers 
servicing customers in the United States that the USG maintained oversight to nominally 
protect its own national security interests [41].  
Thus, although the USG held varying degrees of preeminence within the remote 
sensing and SATCOM sectors of the commercial space industry, its overall trajectory in 
this time of robust commercial space industry growth is toward the position of a customer 
within this international marketplace. With this in mind, the following section briefly 
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describes the current state of USG laws, doctrine, and policy that currently apply to U.S. 
licensed commercial space service providers.  
2. Current Policy, Doctrine, and Regulatory Framework 
Armed with the context of the history leading up to the current relationship between 
the USG and the commercial space sector, it is now appropriate to evaluate, in order, 
current USG perspectives, guiding space doctrine, and, finally, an overview of current 
licensing requirements. 
The topic of DOD reliance on commercial systems is currently receiving significant 
attention at the national level in light of the recent standing up of the USSF. Numerous 
legislative bodies, civil and military leaders, and policy documents have addressed the 
issue, and they all echo a similar refrain: the United States must leverage commercial 
capabilities if it wishes to ensure space effectively supports national security [3], [42], [43]. 
One example of this organizational direction is seen in the 2020 publication of United 
States Space Force Vision for Satellite Communications (hereby referred to as Vision for 
SATCOM). This document outlines the new direction USSF must follow to assure the 
availability of SATCOM in future conflicts, with emphasis on the means of strategic 
enterprise procurement. Specifically, instead of focusing on providing the preponderance 
of SATCOM to meet USG needs, national systems will instead be “purpose-built” to 
address “those frequency bands, coverage areas, or specialized capabilities not offered by 
the commercial SATCOM industry” [43]. This has been readily affirmed in public 
statements by the commander of USSF, General Raymond, who outlined a broader 
organizational attitude that the line between government and commercial capabilities 
should be bridged to meet the demands of “the warfighter” [44]. Moreover, recent 
congressional debates in the build-up to the signing of the Fiscal Year 2021 National 
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) yielded a stipulation that the “fencing” of funds would 
occur unless commercial solutions for space domain awareness were procured [45]. 
Clearly, although the importance of space domain awareness is not critical to this research, 
Congress’ willingness to withhold funding unless commercial solutions were found further 
emphasizes the broader commitment to commercial space partnership. Finally, the 
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Commercial Satellite Communications Office is now operating under the USSF to execute 
the Future Commercial SATCOM Acquisition (FCSA) program and has, as of March 2020, 
awarded close to thirty distinct contracts with commercial SATCOM vendors to address 
capacity shortfalls [46]. In short, Congress, the USSF, and military leadership all echo that 
commercial space service providers are now indispensable partners in ensuring national 
security space demands are fulfilled, and this is further revealed by official U.S. policy and 
strategy. 
A complete review of national space strategy lies outside the scope of this 
summary, but it should be noted that reliance on commercial space systems is encouraged 
at the highest levels of doctrine, as seen the 2017 United States National Security Strategy 
down through the 2020 Defense Space Strategy [3], [47]. However, a significant extension 
of this policy warranting further discussion is seen in the 2020 Defense Space Strategy 
(DSS) in the form of a formal commitment in return for strategic partnership with industry. 
Specifically, the DSS states that, for the United States to “maintain space superiority,” it 
will “be prepared to protect and defend U.S. and, as directed, allied, partner, and 
commercial space capabilities” [3]. In other words, the DOD is now willing to engage in 
the active defense of critical commercial space assets to preserve their capability in a time 
of conflict. This commitment cannot be overemphasized because it directly shapes the 
realm of likely scenarios when wargaming DOD’s dependence on commercial space assets. 
Therefore, future analysis must account for a desired adherence to a defense posture that 
includes commercial partners throughout the spectrum of armed conflict, a point that is 
discussed in greater detail in a later section.  
Lastly, it is worth looking at how the above attitude and doctrine are enumerated in 
current regulation and licensing practices. Currently, commercial remote sensing is 
licensed through NOAA and commercial SATCOM is licensed through the FCC [48], [49]. 
However, both licensing processes are vetted against the combined interests of the 
Departments of Commerce, State, Defense, Interior, and the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence. An example of how this is applied is seen in a memorandum covering 
the licensing of “Private Remote Sensing Satellite Systems.” The policy specifically states 
that “The Secretary of Commerce will impose constraints on private remote sensing 
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systems when necessary to meet…foreign policy concerns, and/or national security 
concerns of the United States” [50]. In other words, not only will companies actively 
contracted to support the USG be subject to restrictions on their use, but rather all remote 
sensing commercial ventures licensed in the United States must conform to the security 
interests of the USG when seeking licenses in the United States. 
Thus, in summary, the current state of USG relations with the commercial space 
industry is one of intentional engagement across a wide range of technological fronts. This 
engagement is propelled forward by USG security interests that are intrinsically linked to 
the successful incorporation of commercial capabilities into national security space efforts. 
This relationship is further enhanced by the recognition that the commercial space 
industries’ willingness to engage in explicit support to U.S. defense efforts brings with it 
an obligation to defend those assets in a time of conflict. Moreover, it is a commitment that 
heavily shapes the wargaming guiding principles and wargaming methodologies.  
3. Current DOD-Commercial Space-Reliance  
Finally, the following is a representative list of current DOD-awarded contracts to 
commercial ISR and SATCOM companies that provides a baseline for wargaming 
commercial space representation. This list is, by no means, exclusive, but it does show the 
range of current purchasing initiatives that represent the scale of DOD and USG utilization 
of commercial space service vendors. Recall that these contracts leverage the range of 
commercial SATCOM and ISR capabilities covered in Chapter II. 
• On November 24, 2019, “Iridium Satellite LLC [was] awarded a 
$9,378,867 [contract] to support commercial satellite-based network 
services for the Department of Defense (DOD) in the areas of satellite, 
ground node, user equipment/terminal software and hardware 
development, integration and testing” [51]. 
• On June 18, 2020, the “U.S. Space Force Commercial Satellite 
Communications Office (CSCO) awarded Peraton… a $56 million 
contract under the Future Commercial Satcom Acquisition (FCSA) 
program… for the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).” [52] 
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• On September 15, 2016, it was announced that “Inmarsat Government in 
Reston, Va., will provide a variety of commercial SATCOM 
telecommunications to the U.S. military under terms of a potential $450 
million contract.” [53] 
• “The Pentagon’s commercial satellite communications (COMSATCOM) 
office will release a final proposal request next April for a potential 10-
year, $1 billion contract to provide the Navy’s broadband enterprise 
satellite services, with plans to award a contract in October 2020.” [7] 
• “SES Government Solutions and Isotropic Systems have received an 
antenna evaluation contract with the U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory 
to test Isotropic Systems’ multi-beam terminal over SES’s O3b Medium 
Earth Orbit (MEO) constellation.” [54] 
• On March 3, 2020, Peraton announced it “[had] been awarded a $218.6 
million contract to provide commercial satellite communications services 
for the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM).” [55] 
• On October 21, 2016, Planet announced “[it had] just signed a landmark 
agreement with the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the U.S. 
government’s source of geospatial intelligence” to provide imaging 
services and products. [56] 
• On October 15, 2019, it was also announced that “the NRO awarded 
Planet an unclassified, multi-year subscription service contract for daily, 
large-area, 3–5 meter resolution commercial imagery collection.” [57] 
By no means is this list complete, but the scope of providers, services, and relative 
recency of the initiatives further supports the assertion that U.S. national security is now a 
ready customer of commercial space-based SATCOM and remote sensing products and is 
already heavily dependent on their services.  
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B. SUMMARY 
In summary, the relationship between the USG and the commercial space industry 
has certainly adapted over the years to account for the preponderance of capability now 
found in the commercial sector. However, and more meaningfully, the relationship is now 
well defined by rules, regulation, policy, and defense commitments that show that the 
contracted commercial sector is now well established and a trusted member of the broader 
U.S. remote sensing and communications construct. It is this fact that now opens the door 
to the notion that the commercial sector may be held at risk by an adversary to the United 
States in times of conflict, a reality that now drives the identification of guiding principles 
and wargaming methodologies.  
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IV. SPACE CONFLICT AND GUIDING PRINCIPLES 
Armed with an understanding of DOD-commercial space relations and reliance, the 
challenge of modeling these interactions must now be addressed. However, prior to 
constructing wargaming methodologies, we must first identify the unique dynamics and 
ensuing guiding principles bounding DOD reliance on commercial space during times of 
conflict. To identify these attributes, this chapter starts with a brief introduction to the space 
domain and space conflict. Then, more specific commercial space reliance considerations 
during times of conflict are identified and summarized into key guiding principles for 
incorporation into the proposed wargame design covered in the next chapter. 
A. THE SPACE DOMAIN AND SPACE CONFLICT 
To better understand the pressures and challenges on commercial space operators 
during hostilities, the most important attributes of their context, the space domain and space 
conflict, must first be introduced. The space domain and its distinction from terrestrial 
domains of conflict has received considerable attention over the past two decades from the 
DOD and cannot be exhaustively covered here. However, several key attributes must be 
reviewed to add context to a discussion of space conflict and to the challenges and physical 
constraints faced by commercial space operators.  
1. The Space Domain 
First, the perpetual physical motion of orbits is a major distinction from terrestrial 
domains. For instance, the motion of on-orbit satellites is inherent, continuous, and, for 
most orbital regimes, causes them to routinely transit over multiple borders and regional 
boundaries. Typical orbits range in altitude from approximately 250 km for low earth orbit 
(LEO) satellites all the way to 36,000 km for geosynchronous (GEO) satellites. 
Additionally, some orbits extend even further out into cislunar space between the Earth 
and the Moon, but the orbits of interest for this research are limited to LEO through GEO. 
Furthermore, orbital velocities are measured in thousands of kilometers per hours, and 
orbital periods range from around ninety minutes to twenty-four hours or more allowing 
some satellites to circle the earth multiple times a day while some remain fixed overhead. 
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Thus, orbits and their physical attributes are not singular in their properties and span a wide 
range of velocities, altitude, characteristics, and temporal considerations. Therefore, 
wargames modeling satellite orbits must account for this variety when representing on-
orbit constellations with particular emphasis on temporal and location attributes when 
attempting to model a satellites availability to a specific terrestrial region.  
Given this brief introduction to the varying orbital attributes in the space domain, a 
discussion of key terrain is now appropriate. Given the wide range of orbital regimes, their 
different properties lend themselves to a variety of applications with some being more 
suited for certain applications than others. One example is a geosynchronous orbit located 
around 36,000 km from Earth at such a distance that it orbits the earth every twenty-four 
hours. Therefore, it maintains its relative position to the earth and effectively stays above 
a single terrestrial point so long as it is maintained at that orbital location. This relatively 
stationary position makes it convenient for communication applications given that ground 
antennas do not typically need to track the satellite throughout the day to remain pointed 
at the satellite. However, its large distance from Earth makes imaging from a 
geosynchronous satellite less appropriate unless one is attempting to take low resolution 
pictures of a large portion of Earth, a utility more suited for weather monitoring than for 
tactical intelligence. Meanwhile, a LEO orbit, given its very low orbital altitude, might lend 
itself to an imaging satellite taking advantage of the low altitude to produce high resolution 
imagery or sensing. However, utilizing the same orbit for communication brings with it the 
potential need to track the satellite, especially if using a directional antenna. In short, the 
range of applications, constellation designs, and potential orbits are too numerous to fully 
cover, but they are well summarized in Table 5 taken from the Joint Doctrine Publication 







Table 5. Orbital Regimes and Applications. Source: [58]. 
 
 
Table 5, from JP 3-14, summarizes typical orbital regimes and their common uses. 
Of note for our analysis are the LEO, MEO, and GEO orbits used by the four example 
satellite constellations described in Chapter II.  
Lastly, it is important to note that satellites are usually exceptionally expensive and 
always relatively expensive to build and launch. Satellites range in size, but example costs 
for satellites like those discussed in Chapter II typically range from $4,000 to $14,000 per 
pound, or total costs ranging from $10 million to $300 million [59]. Moreover, servicing a 
satellite is extremely complex and rarely done due to the cost and reality that most satellites 
are not designed for on-orbit servicing [60]. Therefore, failures, whether intentional or 
accidental, usually have significant and irreversible effects, and may render the satellites 
or individual payloads inoperable. Moreover, even small collisions with space debris or 
other objects at orbital speeds likely mean total loss of the satellite. All these factors 
combine to demonstrate that operating satellites in space is expensive and predicated on 
undisturbed operating conditions to allow for continued operation. Additionally, anomalies 
or failures can typically only be addressed by what already exists on the satellite in the 
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form of redundancy and troubleshooting capabilities. Therefore, in summary, space 
operations are inherently complex, expensive, and sensitive to outside interference. With 
that said, it is now appropriate to review the classical framework for space conflict.  
2. Space Conflict 
Space conflict is, for the purpose of this research, defined as any direct or threatened 
act of aggression toward space-related assets or space providers. These actions may come 
from a variety of actors across the full spectrum from criminals to nation-states. They may 
be openly threatened by words or preceding actions, or they may not be discovered until 
well after an attack is executed. Moreover, they may be permanent in their effects or 
entirely reversible. Regardless, acts of aggression in space span across a wide spectrum 
that can have both intentional and unintentional consequences both in the space domain 
and terrestrially. To this end, these acts of aggression, their impact, and their reversibility 
are commonly summarized based on severity and reversibility, as shown in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. Spectrum of Space Conflict. Source: [61]. 
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Figure 1 shows the relative level of reversibility along the bottom and a sampling 
of the kinds of threats faced by on-orbit objects. In this instance, reversibility is analogous 
to lethal and non-lethal effects often used to describe fires in other combat-related contexts. 
Additionally, one must note that not all threats are readily available to all actors as some 
require higher degrees of technical capability and/or developed launch systems to place an 
object in orbit. One example would be a kinetic anti-satellite weapon, also known as an 
ASAT weapon, or nuclear payload that requires launch and control capabilities not 
possessed by many nations. Moreover, “cyber-attacks” are shown as covering the full 
spectrum of reversibility because their effects can vary widely. However, cyber-attacks 
also pose a significant risk because they can potentially be executed by a wide range of 
actors to achieve unanticipated and asymmetrical consequences. These kinds of attacks are 
often hard to detect and attribute, factors that make them desirable depending on the 
intended outcomes of the attack. Lastly, some forms of attack are inherently directed at a 
specific target while others have indiscriminate effects on many targets regardless of 
ownership, purpose, or nationality. An example of a directed attack might be a jammer 
used against a certain uplink or downlink channel on a single satellite, while a kinetic kill 
ASAT, although initially directed at a specific target, may cause massive amounts of debris 
that affect numerous orbital regimes for days to years afterwards. Thus, in summary, 
potential threats to on-orbit systems span a large spectrum, varying in their degree of 
reversibility, and spanning the full range of isolated to indiscriminate.  
Secondly, space conflict is also characterized by the objectives of the competing 
parties. More specifically, when considering conflict in space, it is important to 
characterize the desired objectives of the parties involved. For example, a space power 
such as the United States may have the objective of maintaining the welfare of its military 
space assets and commercial space assets alike due in part to its military dependence on 
these systems, but also on the strategic, scientific, and economic importance of the space 
domain itself. This is easily ascertained because it aligns with stated national policy [3], 
[62]. Thus, by extension, the United States may pursue courses of action and responses to 
situations that maintain the future viability of the space domain or account for other non-
defense-related factors. However, in contrast, state actors that are less dependent on space 
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or who wish to degrade another nation’s space capabilities, may pursue more intentionally 
destructive courses of action that maximize both the immediate and long-term impacts. 
Now, these examples should not be mistaken as dictating responses in every tactical 
situation, but rather provide brief examples of how objectives can shape which acts of 
aggression a space actor may pursue or avoid. With this perspective, it is now worth 
considering some of the tools space actors can use to mitigate threats to their assets.  
Space capabilities that enable protection from adversaries are typically called 
defensive space control (DSC) capabilities [58]. These capabilities can range from passive 
efforts such as built-in protections or redundancies all the way to maneuvers to prevent 
engagement or changes of satellite configuration to prevent the degradation of a sensor [6]. 
Of course, the nature of specific protective systems or techniques are typically closely held 
and classified, but the emphasis is less on their capabilities, which are ever evolving, and 
more on who typically makes use of them: state actors. As seen earlier, space design, 
construction, and launch are expensive. Therefore, added systems or capability such as 
additional maneuverability or other self-protection measures are not typically found on 
commercial satellites because they translate to additional weight and costs that undercut 
profit and have limited application for a non-combatant. Meanwhile, a state-actor designing 
a military satellite will incorporate these features from the beginning with the expressed 
intent of use in a contested environment. However, since this is discussed at length in the 
following chapters, further analysis must wait. Instead, it must simply be noted that not all 
space actors have the capability, necessity, or desire to equip themselves with tools to 
protect themselves from traditional space threats, especially commercial actors. This reality 
has far reaching implications for strategies, tactics, modeling, and wargaming, and heavily 
influences this discussion of commercial-specific considerations and guiding principles.  
B. THE COMMERCIAL PARADIGM 
As we have seen in the history of commercial space, its relationship to the DOD, 
and in the classical thought on space conflict, there exists a division of paradigms between 
competitive space powers and traditionally non-combatant commercial actors in space. 
This bifurcation of the status of space actors is a false, if understandable, projection of 
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historical delineations between combatants and non-combatants seen in more classical 
combat domains. However, with the blurring of these lines brought about by DOD’s 
contracting of commercial SATCOM and remote sensing to augment the U.S. national 
military establishment, it is now time to identify what uniquely commercial considerations 
heavily influence how commercial actors will respond when threated during times of 
conflict. From these, new vectors of influence are identified that will guide the 
development of the guiding principles.  
1. Unique Attributes of Commercial Space 
Ultimately, discerning the guiding principles governing commercial space reliance 
hinges on the characterization of a uniquely commercial paradigm common to commercial 
space actors. More specifically, there exist considerations for commercial actors pursuing 
business goals that are not common to the typical perspective of military planners charged 
with the mission of national defense or prevailing in times of conflict. These considerations 
are the byproduct of the reality that commercial actors are, at least partially, accountable 
to their own solvency and, by extension, their investors and customers. Failure to account 
for this in the long term obviously has significant impact on a come and may, ultimately, 
results in dissolution. This stands in contrasts to state actors who do not face insolvency if 
they fail to maintain functioning space-based capabilities. Therefore, it is unsurprising that 
companies are, to varying degrees, subject to a common set of constraints in their decision 
making that stands apart from traditional considerations for state actors. This research 
identified four facets of this overarching self-interest that are uniquely commercial in 
nature, listed below: 
1. Relations with customers  
2. Relations with regulators 
3. Current business model 
4. Future commercial viability 
Elaborating on these, the first consideration, relations to customers, is the need for 
a company to maintain a customer base willing and able to purchase their services or 
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products. This customer base is characterized by the consumer’s willingness to buy a 
service or product and by the size of the customer base. Additionally, a customer base may 
consist of either civilian or government buyers, and a company’s relationships to both 
affect their willingness to purchase said services or products, directly affecting sales and 
profitability.  
Secondly, a commercial actor must consider their relationship to regulators who 
allow access to these customers through the exercising of many of the regulatory processes 
described in Chapter III. A failure to ensure good working relationships to regulators can, 
therefore, negate access to customers, which then further affects sales and profitability. On 
the contrary, newly improved relations with foreign regulators might also increase access 
to customers not previously reachable. Either way, the ramifications of this commercial 
consideration directly influence commercial decision making and are, therefore, a 
necessary inclusion as a central tenet of the commercial paradigm. 
Third, commercial actors must preserve their business model, which manifests 
itself in the physical hardware in orbit and on the ground, and in the type of product being 
delivered. With regard to the on-orbit assets, and given the aforementioned expenses 
associated with establishing these systems on orbit, commercial actors view their assets as 
critical and, in many instances, irreplaceable lynchpins in their business model. Therefore, 
any potential loss of these systems could render a company unable to execute their basic 
business model for months or years depending on the type of loss. Additionally, any 
potential harm to their ground systems or, especially, their satellites are potentially 
devastating. Ultimately, the loss of the physical means to execute a business model is a 
massive loss that may not be recoverable in the short term. Physical assets, especially on-
orbit assets, thus represent strategic investments for the company and often represent 
capital investments that are difficult to replace despite being insured in most instances. 
Therefore, there is significant motivation to avoid unwanted interference with these assets, 
especially if the company can influence the situation to avoid such losses. Likewise, 
restrictions on the types of services being provided or the means of how these services are 
being provided, such as a policy like “shutter control” can have equally damaging effects 
on a business model, though these affects would likely be more reversible if the restraints 
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were removed. Thus, the current business model also must be accounted for as a primary 
consideration within the commercial paradigm.  
Lastly, commercial actors must also consider future commercial viability. Although 
this consideration appears to be a combination of the first two principles projected out into 
the future, it is in fact distinct and fundamental. Specifically, while the first two facets 
account for the current pressures faced by a company, they are also predominantly external 
pressures that influence whether a company is able to do business and remain profitable. 
In other words, access to markets and the well-being of physical assets are predominantly 
affected by external actors imposing risks on the decision makers of a company. Future 
commercial viability is, however, concerned with a commercial company’s willingness to 
engage in servicing its existing customers in the future, a decidedly internal choice that is 
not the direct product of an external actor’s pressures. Specifically, a company might cease 
its engagement with past customers to grow a new customer base, an internal choice in 
pursuit of profitability, security, or other internal ambitions. For example, if a commercial 
company does not believe its current customer base, which includes the DOD within the 
context of this research, is sufficient in either scale or profitability, the company may 
choose to no longer offer these services to the DOD in favor of more lucrative endeavors. 
This is not to say that this concept is divorced from the concepts of access to markets and 
a company’s business model, but it is to say that companies have a vision for their future 
business model that is the product of internal ambitions and not strictly a reaction to 
external pressures. This might manifest slowly, but it certainly is an influencing 
consideration for commercial actors when considering their own actions in times of 
conflict.  
In summary, although these considerations cannot be uniformly applied to each 
situation, each company, in its own way, must consider all four of these constraints, thus 
characterizing the additional factors unique to the commercial space paradigm. These 
factors heavily influence how a commercial actor might respond in times of conflict to 
either directed aggression toward them specifically or to broader concerns about hostility 
in the space domain. In doing so, they present newly identified vectors to influence 
commercial actors, a reality warranting more discussion in the following chapter.  
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2. Commercial Considerations as Avenues of Influence 
The threats posed by these new vectors of potential influence on commercial actors 
must be considered in addition to the more classical threats affecting space-related systems 
seen in Figure 1. This list is not meant to be exhaustive. Rather, it must simply be noted 
that several new categories of threats are revealed that are especially pertinent to 
commercial actors, starting first with influencing a commercial actor’s ability to do 
business.  
a. Relations to Customers and Regulators 
It was previously shown that a commercial actor’s relations to customers and 
regulators had profound effects on their ability to execute its business model. This 
influence was achieved by taking away, redirecting, or increasing a company’s access to 
willing customers. In light of this, the following new threat vectors for influencing these 
relations are revealed: 
• Adversaries may attempt to leverage control or access to markets to deny 
access to traditional customers through laws or regulations. Conversely, 
adversaries may promise or ensure expanded access to new markets in an 
attempt to influence decision makers. The objective would obviously be to 
curtail a commercial actor’s support of DOD operations by imposing costs 
on business operations within an adversary’s political boundaries for the 
company in question or provide more lucrative opportunities elsewhere. 
• Adversaries may utilize taxation, fines, or threatened legal action, both 
justified or unjustified, to further dissuade a company from supporting 
DOD efforts.  
• An adversary may attempt to alter a customer base by directly threatening 
significant customers of a commercial company with related sanctions, 
fines, or other punitive acts to dissuade customers from engaging in 
business with a specific commercial actor.  
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• Adversaries may also attempt to strategically purchase all available 
SATCOM resources being offered from commercial satellites in key 
orbital positions in GEO to deny USG procurement of services. 
As an example of this kind of threat, the United States leveraged the same style of 
influence as recently as July, 2020, when it sanctioned eleven Chinese companies for ties 
to human rights violations. Specifically, these Chinese companies were prohibited from 
accessing American goods and technology, which, in turn, dissuaded American companies 
from doing business with these eleven Chinese suppliers [63]. In short, a nation dissuaded 
commercial companies from conducting business with China by denying access to China’s 
markets through sanctions. More directly applied to commercial space reliance, this might 
occur as a restriction to customers or frequency bands for a SATCOM provider within a 
country or outlawing the purchasing of imagery from a remote sensing company. 
Regardless, these examples show that commercial actors supporting the DOD must be 
ready to face both the political and financial challenges of heavily altered access to markets 
if its customer base is diversified across multiple regions or is, in part, regulated by an 
adversary.  
b. Current Business Model 
Secondly, it was shown that commercial actors’ solvency is a direct product of its 
maintenance of its business model, both from a physical and service perspective. Therefore, 
an adversary seeking to directly influence the immediate decisions of a commercial actor 
may hold at risk a company’s assets or threaten the denial or destruction of its physical 
assets or means of providing service as seen in the following examples: 
• An adversary may threaten an attack on a satellite. This attack may be 
reversible or permanent, and it may be executed through either physical or 
cyber means.  
• Attacks can also be wrought against ground infrastructure, which, 
depending on the architecture of the space system, may also represent 
significant investment or be fundamental to the service itself.  
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• Lastly, an adversary may attack the means of distribution of a service, 
whether it is through a website or user terminals. Either way, the flow of 
information or a channel for service may be disrupted.  
One example of this threat vector was the aggressive proximity operations 
conducted by Russia against Intelsat as reported in 2015 [64]. Although no harm was done 
to these assets at the time, the active rendezvous and proximity operation against two 
Intelsat satellites in GEO highlighted how little Intelsat could have done to directly respond 
to this potentially destructive act. Additionally, as early as 2014, it was reported that the 
Chinese military was directly targeting “US satellite partners,” clearly imposing an 
additional direct cost on U.S. commercial space providers [65]. Ultimately, attacks like 
these are more direct than broader, relationship-focused acts of aggression. Therefore, they 
are more suited to immediately affect commercial decision makers with the likely intent to 
cause an operator to voluntarily shut down its operations and, thus, contractual support to 
the DOD. Furthermore, these forms of attack can be directed, in general, at all SATCOM 
or remote sensing satellites with little distinction. Thus, in summary, commercial actors are 
not immune to attacks on its business model, and, in fact, may be the least prepared to 
counter such moves because of the previously noted limited assets and defensive counter 
space capability.  
c. Future Commercial Viability 
Lastly, it was shown that a company must account for its future commercial 
viability, a reality that, for the purpose of this research, is a product of internal ambitions 
and systemic challenges instead of threatened hostile acts. This type of consideration, as 
distinct from threats of denial of access to markets or future imposed regulation, is best 
explained via the following examples: 
• If a company can be led to believe its current business model will cease to 
exist post-conflict due to significant orbital debris resulting from conflict 
or other systemic problems, it may terminate otherwise historically 
profitable contracts. Instead, they may choose liquidation or other 
operational concepts to remain profitable in the long term. 
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• If a company believes the commercial space industry is in rapid decline 
due to significant policy changes, regulation, or conflict, it may choose to 
diversify its operations and/or curtail its services, even if said policies or 
regulations are not specifically directed at the company.  
An example of this kind of consideration is harder to come by, but there exist 
parallels with the Battle of the North Atlantic during World War II. Specifically, open 
submarine warfare on shipping quickly demanded the need for military escorts of directly 
subsidized or nationalized shipping [66]. In other words, a domain, the ocean’s surface, 
was denied to unprotected commercial actors supporting national military goals, which 
necessitated the immediate intervention by the state to ensure continued service. In short, 
commercial actors are also responsive to their own confidence in their future viability. 
Thus, it becomes necessary to appreciate how the DOD must account for collateral damage 
to the space domain’s usability or to the space industry as a whole. Affecting these broader 
domains can have long-term effects on the availability of commercial operators in the 
future, even if those effects are not immediately felt.  
In summary, these new vectors of attack provide a thorough basis for identifying 
guiding principles inherent in DOD reliance on commercial space actors. Therefore, it is 
now time to identify the guiding principles that are used as a summary of these identified 
commercial considerations and ensuing attack vectors.  
C. GUIDING PRINCIPLES 
In light of the above identified vectors for influencing commercial actors providing 
services to the DOD, the following six guiding principles are deduced which serve as the 
basis for the creation of wargaming methodologies: 
1. Assets may hold strategic value to commercial partners: It was shown that 
commercial assets represent strategic investments of both time and money, 
and they are lynchpins of a commercial actor’s business model that cannot 
be quickly replaced. Therefore, unlike the DOD, which may view a 
capability as strategic supported by tactical components, commercial 
actors potentially view their assets as strategic to their business model. 
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Therefore, a commercial actor can be influenced greatly by adversaries 
holding their assets, both ground and on-orbit, at risk. 
2. Market access cannot be assumed and may be leveraged: Markets are, as 
previously shown, heavily regulated. Moreover, the DOD often represents 
only a fraction of a given commercial actors’ customer base. Therefore, 
markets must be seen as a point of leverage against either the commercial 
actor’s profitability or against the DOD’s position as a customer. Access 
to willing markets is, therefore, a powerful tool in shaping a commercial 
actor’s willingness to lease its services to the DOD. Likewise, restricting 
or increasing access to these markets also weigh heavily on the business 
calculus of a commercial vendor seeking to ensure profitability.  
3. Current and future profitability must be protected: Commercial actors are 
accountable to their own profitability, and therefore cannot be expected to 
pursue courses of actions that knowingly sacrifice their sources of 
revenue. Moreover, if market conditions degrade or the space domain 
becomes unusable, commercial actors cannot be expected to continue to 
provide services if they cannot support business operations.  
Additionally, there are also three implied considerations that are not specific to a 
singular commercial vector of influence but that also deserve inclusion into our list of 
guiding principles as outlined below: 
4. Company stakeholders must be known and accounted for: The 
effectiveness of the identified attack vectors is at least partially dependent 
on a company’s allegiance. This allegiance can be a product of a customer 
base, registration, or, more importantly, the national identity of key 
decision-makers. Therefore, threats to space partners must always be 
viewed in light of a company’s demonstrated allegiance, registration, and 
customer-base nationality.  
5. The existence of undisclosed influence must be acknowledged: In much of 
the above discussion, interactions in the forms of coercion, threats, 
41 
commitments, and informal agreements were discussed as if they were 
known by both DOD and commercial actors real-time. However, it must 
be acknowledged that communication is often directed and may not be 
readily available to all parties, whether intentionally or unintentionally. 
Therefore, any wargaming of these scenarios must account for limited or 
delayed proliferation of awareness when acts of aggression in the form of 
communication are used.  
6. Proliferation complicates capability denial: Lastly, the proliferation of 
commercial space systems challenges unilateral actions in the space 
domain. U.S. government attempts to curtail commercial actions to 
support DOD security interests will be undermined by the reality that 
foreign-registered companies often possess similar capabilities and are not 
responsible to DOD or USG direction. However, this same proliferation 
makes it difficult for an adversary to “blockade” the commercial reliance 
of another country’s military given the interconnectedness of multiple 
international sectors of communication and business [6]. In other words, 
directed denial of space-based services to degrade an opponent’s military 
will be hard to achieve without inadvertently affecting numerous 
industries on an international level resulting in significant collateral 
effects.  
D. CONCLUSION 
In summary, this chapter introduced the basics of the space domain and space 
conflict. Then, key commercial considerations were identified, which, in turn, revealed 
many new forms of influence that are especially effective against the commercial 
paradigm. Then, in light of these forms of attack and influence, the overarching guiding 
principles were identified that must form the foundation of attempts to model and wargame 
DOD reliance on commercial space. Now, wargaming methodologies can be created that 
are guided by these principles, an effort covered in the following chapter.  
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V. PROPOSED METHODOLOGIES FOR WARGAMING 
COMMERCIAL SPACE RELIANCE 
With a commercial paradigm and guiding principles established, it is now necessary 
to develop methodologies that enable the application of these principles to the discipline 
of wargaming. However, given that the craft of wargaming spans a large spectrum of 
purposes, users, formats, rules, applications, and interfaces, it is necessary to first define 
wargaming and, specifically, how it is commonly utilized by the Department of Defense. 
Therefore, this chapter introduces and defines wargaming as it pertains to this research and 
its utilization within the DOD. Then, based on this context, the intended style of wargame 
used for this research is identified. Finally, a set of wargaming methodologies are proposed 
that enable the application of the guiding principles to the selected style of wargaming. 
A. WARGAMING INTRODUCTION 
Wargaming historians typically trace wargaming’s direct application to military 
planning back to the Prussian Kriegsspiel, literally translated “war-game,” of the 1820s 
[10], [67]. Since then, it has been used in a wide range of analytic, educational, and 
experiential activities ranging from tactical scenarios to instruct small units all the way up 
to operational and strategic planners considering campaign analysis at the highest levels. 
To that end, the design of wargames varies greatly based on several factors including their 
purpose, information structure, level of detail, and target audience. However, this diversity 
also produces a wide range of definitions and terminologies that obfuscate this discussion 
unless explicitly defined and scoped. Therefore, for the purposes of this research, a 
“wargame” will refer to a “representation of conflict or competition, in which people make 
decisions and respond to the consequences of those decisions” as defined by Joint 
Publication 5-0: Joint Planning [68]. However, beyond this definition, it is also important 
to further distinguish the discipline of wargaming from the discipline of modeling and 
simulation (M&S), especially in light of the growth of computer-based analytical tools 
available today, which are often conflated with wargaming.  
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Specifically, wargaming is distinct from modeling and simulation in that it seeks to 
understand the human decision-making process vice quantifying the relative value of 
different force structures or technologies. For instance, a study using M&S seeks to 
compare the operational effectiveness of alternative force structures, which, in simpler 
terms, is an assessment of how well a force fights. Alternatively, a study leveraging 
wargaming seeks to develop concepts of employment or concepts of operation that allow 
a commander to test the effectiveness of new doctrine or determine how to best leverage 
new technology. In other words, it seeks to determine how a force fights. To that end, this 
thesis’s recommended wargaming methodologies improve the representation of DOD 
reliance on commercial space partners and assets. This improved representation enables 
warfighters to better understand and evaluate what effects any potential unavailability of 
these assets might have on the planning and successful execution of military operations. 
However, to suggest revised methodologies for modeling DOD’s reliance on commercial 
space partners, a style of wargaming must first be identified that will provide greatest 
benefit to the DOD wargaming community. Thus, it is worthwhile to briefly review the 
range of DOD wargaming efforts. 
B. DOD SPACE WARGAMING 
A full review of DOD wargaming practices is outside the scope of this research. 
However, several organizations such as the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) and RAND 
Corporation provide useful reviews and support to the DOD wargaming community [9], 
[69], [70]. To that end, this brief discussion of DOD wargaming relies heavily on a 2019 
report by RAND Corporation titled Next-Generation Wargaming for the U.S. Marine 
Corps. This research “gather [ed] information on the tools, approaches, best practices, and 
other lessons learned from a wide variety of organizations involved in defense or national 
security wargaming, in order to make recommendations to the U.S. Marine Corps as it 
[sought] to expand its wargaming capability” [9]. This research compiled overviews of 
21 organizations within the DOD wargaming community. From this analysis, it also 
identified 77 unique wargaming tools ranging from basic tabletop boardgame-style 
wargames to advanced computer simulation tools. However, it also noted that “manual 
board game mechanics” were exceptionally prevalent within DOD wargaming because this 
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style “imposed processes on gameplay and adjudication, making the outcomes of player 
decisions more transparent and easier to document” [9]. Dr. Appleget notes this same 
theme in The Craft of Wargaming, A Detailed Planning Guide for Defense Planners and 
Analysts, which discussed the important role of “analytic wargames” in military 
applications because of their suitability for organizing the “scenario,” “data,” “rules,” 
“players,” and “analysis” [71]. Furthermore, The Craft of Wargaming describes their 
distinguishing characteristic as their intent to “[seek] answers” to a “sponsor’s problem,” 
and possessing an “objective,” which makes them well suited for military applications. 
However, analytic wargames should not be thought of as uniform given that they may 
utilize a spectrum of “styles,” “player engagement formats,” or other widely varying traits 
[71]. This thesis, therefore, develops methodologies that are presented according to two 
separate spectrums that, together, provide maximum applicability across a range of analytic 
wargames as discussed in detail the following section.  
The first spectrum utilized is the Level of Warfare. This spectrum is utilized 
because military wargames are often directed at a specific level of warfare and 
recommended injects to one level of warfare may be of little value to another level. 
Therefore, to maximize the utility of these wargaming methodologies, recommendations 
are presented along this spectrum. Next, the spectrum of “information structures” is used 
as the second variable [71]. The Craft of Wargaming described information structures as 
taking one of two forms: open or closed. Open wargames allow for the game information 
to be equally available to all players involved while closed wargames restrict the 
availability of this information to certain players at certain times. Thus, in a closed format 
wargame, “each player will only be provided the information that their collection assets 
could reasonably be expected to obtain and report” [71]. Moreover, closed format 
wargames typically “require separate rooms for each team represented, as well as a white 
cell or control cell that maintains the ‘ground truth’” [71]. This method was, thus, selected 
because the guiding principles highlight the role directed communications play when 
evaluating DOD’s reliance on commercial space-partners. However, the full spectrum of 
open and closed format wargames is used to maximize utility to as many DOD wargame 
applications as possible.  
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Armed with the context of a selected wargaming style, it is now appropriate to 
synthesize our commercial paradigm and guiding principles into recommended wargaming 
methodologies, which are divided into both construct and execution recommendations.  
C. GAME CONSTRUCT RECOMMENDATIONS 
To apply the commercial paradigm and guiding principles to analytic wargames, 
the wargame must first incorporate them into its design. Specifically, the wargame’s 
measurement space must accurately represent commercial space actors and their 
interactions with the DOD. Then, through this improved game setup, gameplay mechanics 
are refined to better incorporate the guiding principles and, ultimately, facilitate more 
consistent and accurate environments to examine player decision-making. Therefore, to 
begin, the following recommendations are made specifically to game construct. 
1. Representation 
First, this thesis shows that commercial interests, goals, and ambitions are unique 
enough to necessitate inclusion into wargames that evaluate objectives associated with 
SATCOM and space-based ISR. Therefore, it is critical that these wargames start 
incorporating commercial space through representation in the game construct. However, 
the means of representation vary greatly and cannot be prescribed due to the wide range of 
wargame designs and objectives. Examples of representation might manifest as players 
representing commercial space partners, game pieces, rules, adjudication techniques, or 
general player education before a game to name a few examples. Although each of these 
examples cannot be typified fully, the following recommendations can be made based upon 
the guiding principles that relate to under-represented facets of DOD’s reliance on 
commercial space partners. 
Ideally, a wargame should incorporate all pertinent commercial actors, each 
provided with their own unique company and associated interests. This is based upon the 
commercial paradigm that illuminated the competitive nature of commercial interests 
which must account for profitability and solvency. Players representing commercial actors 
are not a requirement, but wargames should represent these actors and their interests if 
appropriate for their wargame objective and key issues. It is preferable that, if multiple 
47 
commercial companies can be represented, some should be more closely aligned with 
either allied or adversary nations to represent the scope of allegiances inherent in the 
commercial space industry. This recommendation to account for allegiance is shown in the 
commercial paradigm and guiding principle two and four. Likewise, their business models 
should reflect this allegiance in the form of customer bases, revenue sources, and relations 
to national regulatory bodies that are distinct. Moreover, commercial actors are typically 
aligned with traditional customer nations, contractual obligations, or national heritage. Of 
note, not all details such as these are appropriate for all wargame designs and objectives. 
Instead, the wargame designer must identify the ideal means of representation to achieve 
their intended objectives. However, the following example means of representation are 
provided to demonstrate potential tools that can be molded into relevant injects for a variety 
of wargame designs.  
The following examples are broken down by levels of warfare and the spectrum of 
wargame information structures. Table 6 specifically shows the recommended injects, 
suggested wargame objectives, and drawbacks for ends of both spectrums.  




Ultimately, the manner of inclusion remains the prerogative of the wargame 
designer. Regardless, representation of unique and competing commercial space entities 
establishes more accurate portrayals of the competing interests inherent to DOD’s new 
method for sourcing space-based capabilities.  
2. Orientation 
Secondly, representation of commercial actors and interests, whether by players, 
game pieces, rules, etc., requires an orientation to the paradigm being represented. In other 
words, if DOD participants are representing a commercial actor in a wargame, they require 
an introduction to the unique perspective of commercial space actors to represent their 
contributions and perspectives accurately. Similarly, if commercial actors are represented 
through gameplay mechanics, pieces, or rules, then those players that interact with those 
injects must also be oriented to the commercial paradigm to understand the unique qualities 
represented. This orientation should include both an introduction to the commercial 
paradigm and to the common factors affecting a commercial actor’s decision making, 
namely the guiding principles. Specifically, this orientation should cover the following 
relevant information that enables accurate portrayal of commercial space actors if a high 
degree of granularity is desired by the wargame designer and objectives: 
1. A summary of the commercial paradigm, which provides the four key 
commercial considerations comprised of relations with customers, 
relations with regulators, their current business model, and their future 
commercial viability. These collectively represent the generic 
considerations that should guide a team or actor’s decision making. This is 
used to orient the players to commercial interests, especially if the players 
come from a military or non-commercial background.  
2. A designation of a specific commercial company with specific details of 
their constellation and its capabilities, especially those capabilities that 
have relevance to the battlefield. This may also include information about 
when a constellation can provide services, its revisit rates, its potential 
capability, and key limitations if they are relevant to the wargame. It 
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should also include a cursory introduction to the constellation’s 
vulnerabilities and resistance to offensive space control measures. This 
introduction orients play interactions with commercial space actors by 
increasing their awareness of commercial interests, capabilities, and 
vulnerabilities. 
3. Finally, the overview should introduce historical allegiance, current 
relationships and contracts with the involved nations, details regarding its 
customer-base, sources of revenue, and commercial ambitions. It is critical 
that players representing commercial actors understand the driving 
considerations for their own choices. Players with military backgrounds 
may not innately think about the economics and regulatory considerations 
affecting their choices, but this is made easier by outlining a company’s 
financial and business model dependencies. This level of detail may only 
be pertinent to a select set of wargaming objectives, but they should be 
considered if interaction with commercial actors becomes a significant to 
key issues being reviewed. 
By way of example, Table 7 shows a representative orientation that might be used 
by a player representing a commercial SATCOM actor in a wargame.  
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Table 7. Example SATCOM Orientation Product. Adapted from [72]. 
 
 
In summary, representation of commercial SATCOM and ISR providers 
necessitates a thorough orientation if the wargame design and objectives anticipate 
interactions with commercial services and interests. Orientations are necessary regardless 
of if players will be assigned to represent commercial actors due to the unique commercial 
paradigm covered previously, especially when wargaming the operational and strategic 
levels of warfare. 
3. Proliferation 
Lastly, the previously discussed proliferation in commercial space capabilities and 
capacity demands incorporation into wargame constructs because it challenges traditional 
attitudes toward the role of commercial space in two ways.  
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First, a greater number of commercial assets and capacity force game players to 
acknowledge and incorporate DOD’s leveraging of commercial space into their decision-
making process. Specifically, as shown in the guiding principles, commercial actors 
possess, in aggregate, more ISR and SATCOM capacity than state-owned and -operated 
constellations. Moreover, this proliferation of commercial space capabilities and actors is 
consistent with actual ratios of commercially-owned to state-owned satellites which stands 
at nearly 4:1 as of December, 2020 [73]. More telling than the ratio of satellites, however, 
is the ratio of total satellite capacity. Current summaries of DOD SATCOM capacity 
estimate total throughput at roughly 55 Gigabits-per-second (Gbps) while commercial 
SATCOM capacity is estimated to be greater than 2,200 Gbps [74]. Thus, if a 
preponderance of the capability and capacity is in the commercial sector, then future space 
security postures must account for and leverage this reality. Therefore, wargames should 
make efforts to incorporate greater numbers of commercial space capabilities, capacity, 
and actors to reflect current ratios and encourage player incorporation of increased 
commercial bandwidth and imaging capabilities more accurately.  
Secondly, this increased ratio of commercial systems to national systems also 
encourages players to acknowledge that the preponderance of space capabilities on the 
battlefield is not under the direct control of military and political decision makers. 
Therefore, decisions that strain relationships with commercial space actors at the strategic 
level may have significant ramifications when attempting to meet SATCOM and ISR needs 
in the current conflict and beyond. This is, albeit, more applicable to strategic and operation 
level wargames, but wargame designs that incorporate this commercial preponderance 
foster player education on the importance of these relationships. This is especially 
important when players consider how to interact with commercial actors in a wargame 
when commercial space actors are represented.  
However, as with the previous considerations, the exact manner of incorporating 
proliferation varies from wargame to wargame based on many competing wargame design 
factors, driven by the wargame’s objective and key issues. Therefore, the following two 
charts are provided that offer examples based on the level of warfare and the information 
structure utilized by a wargame. These examples are not prescriptive, but, instead, 
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demonstrate how the above two key considerations can be applied to meet wargame design 
demands.  
Table 8  and Table 9 provide four examples each across the previously mentioned 
spectrums of warfare and information structure to assist wargame designers seeking 
explicit examples of how to incorporate proliferated commercial ISR and SATCOM. Each 
example provides a recommended inject to achieve an example wargame objective while 
also acknowledging drawbacks associated with the proposed injection. Many of these 
recommendations come with the associated challenge of educating players on the 
fundamentals of the space domain and space conflict discussed previously. However, 
proliferation of commercial capacity and capability demand this inclusion when wargame 
objectives permit. This inclusion broadens player thinking on an increasingly important 
topic from the tactical to the strategic level. Therefore, wargame designers should compare 
their intended wargame style against the chart to identify example injects and spur 
appropriate incorporation of commercial proliferation into their wargame. 




Table 9. Commercial SATCOM Proliferation Aid 
 
 
For example, if a wargame designer intends to incorporate both DOD reliance on 
commercial SATCOM and reliance on commercial ISR in a strategic, closed information 
structure wargame, the unifying theme is to allow players to contract with commercial 
providers to augment ISR and command and control. Ideally, these commercial actors 
would be represented by players pursuing objectives based upon the commercial paradigm. 
This incorporation will bring with it the added burden of additional adjudication and 
representation challenges. However, the players will gain an understanding of the 
capabilities, objectives, and interests of commercial space actors who can help meet their 
communication and ISR requirements. Detailed representation of these commercial actors 
and their constellations, to include strengths and weaknesses, will further educate players 
on the potential risks and overall limitations of this additional support.  
Thus, by using these aids to better incorporate commercial ISR and SATCOM 
proliferation, wargame players will make decisions in a more accurate context. This leads 
to more realistic outcomes sculpted by DOD reliance on these now-proliferated 
commercial space partners. In summary, the three above changes of representation, 
proliferation, and orientation to wargame setup provide simple means to inject the 
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commercial paradigm and commercial paradigm in a way that can be broadly applied and 
enable the following recommended methodologies to gameplay mechanics.  
D. GAME EXECUTION RECOMMENDATIONS 
These game execution methodologies build upon the framework created by 
amended game setup to create more accurate gameplay dynamics. Moreover, they are 
broken down below into two types, interaction recommendations and effects 
recommendations, starting first with recommended changes to wargame interactions.  
1. Interactions 
As previously discussed, interactions between players in a wargame are a product 
of the design of the wargame itself, specifically its information structure. This design may 
vary significantly based on the desired objective, key issues being addressed, player 
expertise and other considerations. However, this research previously notes that many of 
the guiding principles, namely “market access cannot be assumed and may be leveraged,” 
“company stakeholders must be known and accounted for,” and “the existence of 
undisclosed influence must be acknowledged” all highlight how directed and undisclosed 
communications influence a commercial space partners willingness to provide services to 
the DOD. This real-world interaction is clearly an example of a closed information 
environment which implies that it ought to be modeled as a closed information structure in 
a wargame. However, the following analysis shows that, although preferably modeled as a 
closed information environment, wargame designers also have tools to model this closed 
real-world information structure as an open information structure in a wargame if required 
to meet a specific objective or to conform to a broader requirement for an open information 
structure. Thus, this analysis begins with recommendations for a closed information 
structure followed by recommendations for open information structures and ends with a 
combined decision aid.  
a. Closed Information Structure Interactions 
A closed information structure is well suited to portray many of the dynamics 
highlighted by the guiding principles. However, as previously shown in the Commercial 
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Representation Aid, Table 6, many of these interactions are specific to the operational or 
strategic level of warfare. Tactical level wargames might instead highlight commercial 
capabilities instead of commercial actors because tactical level units have little opportunity 
to interact with commercial actors directly. Therefore, the following recommendations are 
intended for operational or strategic, closed information structure wargames.  
First, if a wargame represents commercial actors with players, commercial space 
players should be separated from the other teams and from each other throughout gameplay 
to account for the broad spectrum of awareness among commercial space actors. 
Specifically, the guiding principles note that undeclared and directed communications must 
be accounted for in the modeling of DOD’s relations to commercial space actors. 
Therefore, commercial space actors would not have access to the intentions, goals, and 
strategies of state actors unless incorporated into planning. Likewise, commercial actors 
would likely not be aware of each other’s intentions and relations to state actors unless 
intentional coordination was involved. Therefore, players representing commercial space 
actors must not be given unrealistic awareness of the battlespace or internal decision-
making processes from other players unless intentionally involved. Instead, their awareness 
of the battlespace and other actors should be limited to their individual communications 
with other players and whatever awareness is gained from their own capabilities if they 
possess ISR satellites. Thus, it is appropriate that gameplay should reflect this disunity by 
separating such players during gameplay. This is consistent with recommended closed 
information structure recommendations found in The Craft of Wargaming. 
Secondly, wargames designs should consider allowing individual commercial 
space players to physically move from their cell to another team’s cell to model the 
inclusion of select commercial partners in DOD operations cells. Thus, in some instances, 
blue (or red) cells may invite commercial players into their internal conversations, much 
like a representative may participate in an operations center. However, it is recommended 
that this choice to move to another team’s location be a decision on the part of the players 
and not a default setup inherent in the game. Of note, this inject also requires a methodical 
data collection strategy to capture these interactions. At a minimum, white cell players will 
be needed to collect the general courses of action and strategies employed by all actors to 
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influence their decision making. This further highlights the need for thorough player 
orientations if players are used to represent commercial actors or interests.  
Lastly, when modeling DOD reliance on commercial space partners, it is 
recommended that communications be treated as a discrete action to allow responses by 
other players to be exchanged. In other words, traditional wargaming typically involves the 
operation of forces that manifest in an action, but they may not typically include 
communication as a distinct and intentional action. This is a byproduct of wargaming’s 
historical emphasis on force-on-force kinetic combat [70]. However, as demonstrated in 
the guiding principles, commercial space actors may be influenced through communication 
as much as through kinetic actions. In fact, a commercial space actor’s greatest response 
might only be elicited through directed communication given that kinetic or cyber acts 
against a commercial actor may negate their ability to choose a course of action altogether. 
Therefore, wargames should incorporate DOD’s communication with its commercial space 
partners and the commercial space industry at large with a closed information structure 
when possible. However, the following recommendations are made that provide options 
for wargames with open information structures.  
b. Open Information Structure Interactions 
An open information structure, to reiterate, generally allows all players to view 
information available to all other players. This structure is not as well suited to modeling 
closed communication dynamics in the real world. However, because of the proliferation 
and value of open analytical wargames, it is important to create tools that enable the 
incorporation of DOD’s reliance on commercial space partners into this wargame format. 
First, instead of trying to model the interactions between commercial actors and 
other actors on the battlefield, it is recommended that an open wargame emphasize the 
value system of commercial actors along with their capabilities and capacity. In other 
words, the wargame should emphasize the commercial paradigm where commercial actors 
have uniquely commercial interests and outlooks on a given scenario. One example would 
be to emphasize the first guiding principle that notes the strategic value of individual 
satellites or constellations to commercial providers. This commercial perspective is already 
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known to nations attempting to influence commercial actors in the real world. Therefore, 
this first guiding principle is well suited to an open information structure as well as closed.  
Secondly, the last guiding principle states the proliferation profoundly challenges 
notions that space-based capabilities can be negated on the modern battlefield. This is a 
second reality that should affect all actors equally and is readily applicable to open 
information structure wargames. For example, a seminar-style wargame with an open 
information structure should consider reminding all players that commercial systems from 
multiple nationalities already continuously image most of the globe. It would be extremely 
challenging to interdict the imaging capability provided by a variety of satellites, 
constellations, companies, and nationalities. Instead, it is more likely that a state actor may 
only degrade some portion of the commercial satellite ISR, and laws such as “shutter 
control” may only serve to limit commercial ISR capabilities licensed by that state-actor. 
Therefore, players in this style of wargame should consider that completely preventing 
imaging of the battlefield from space is not realistically achievable. Thus, this exemplified 
yet another reality that is well suited for open information structures while still providing 
meaningful injects for decision-makers to incorporate into their choices. 
Lastly, the commercial paradigm can be emphasized to help guide discussions and 
player interactions in an open wargame. By giving all players access to commercial 
perspectives, all players may, in turn, improve their understanding of how to interact with 
commercial providers in a manner that serves mutual interests. For instance, if players from 
different and competing countries are vying for commercial services from a single 
commercial space partner, knowledge of the commercial paradigm will help shape their 
interactions. In fact, this common knowledge of the commercial paradigm may reveal new 
forms of influence yet discovered by this research. Ultimately, the incorporation of the 
commercial paradigm for all players to see allows wargames to both educate players while 
at the same time pursue analytical objectives.  
c. Interaction Decision Aid 
The following Interaction Decision Aid,  Table 10, summarizes the examples of 
closed and open information structure formats for use by wargame designers. 
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Finally, given the typical lack defensive measures and hardening on commercial 
spacecraft discussed previously, attacks on commercial spacecraft should be adjudicated 
in accordance with any known lack of resiliency. In other words, if a wargame incorporates 
space control operations or models directed energy or cyber-attacks on space architectures 
in general, then attacks on commercial space actors may result in greater degradation to 
their architecture than to national systems that are designed for resiliency. Examples of 
increased degradation might include longer or more widespread losses of service, or it 
might be permanent loss of a spacecraft instead of a temporary or partial loss. Exceptions 
to this recommendation include the adjudication of kinetic attacks on an orbiting satellite 
given that no amount of resiliency or hardening mitigates kinetic impacts at orbital 
velocities. Additionally, some commercial systems may have advanced cyber security or 
additional hardening built in, but this exception should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis 
predicated on detailed knowledge of the satellite’s resiliency. 
Ultimately, this disparity in effects can easily be adapted across the spectrum of 
warfare, as shown in Table 11. Also, as previously seen in the other methodologies, this 
range of effects is appropriately spread along the spectrum of information structure. 
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Specifically, the loss or degradation of a satellite or its capabilities can, due to the 
challenges of tracking changes in the space domain, be kept as closed information in some 
situations [47]. This is especially true if the loss is due to cyber, at which point even the 
operator of the satellite may have trouble identifying what is occurring. However, more 
overt attacks such as kinetic ASAT attacks may be known to many interested parties and, 
thus, could be easily represented in an open information structure. Therefore, information 
structure remains the proper distinguishing spectrum for this tool. The results are 
summarized in Table 11.  
Table 11. Effect Disparity Decision Aid 
 
 
Thus, in summary, effects on commercial spacecraft or their broader architectures 
should incorporate the relative vulnerability of commercial space assets, especially when 
compared to national systems designed for resiliency and redundancy.  
E. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the incorporation of the commercial paradigm and guiding principles 
first necessitated identification of a wargaming style that provided the greatest benefit to 
the DOD wargaming community. Review of existing wargaming efforts and studies 
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showed that the foundational analytic wargame afforded the greatest utility across the 
largest spectrum of DOD wargaming efforts. From this context, wargaming methodologies 
were presented that enabled the accurate modeling of the commercial paradigm and 
guiding principles for future use by a large spectrum of DOD wargaming efforts. Now, 
wargame designers can quicky reference these tools to find recommended injects and 
considerations based upon their specific wargame design with confidence that the injects 
adhere to the commercial paradigm and guiding principles. To demonstrate their utility, it 
is now appropriate to evaluate these methodologies within the context of a current Marine 





VI. ASSASSIN’S MACE CASE STUDY OF PROPOSED 
PRINCIPLES AND METHODOLOGIES 
To evaluate the effectiveness of the wargaming methodologies proposed in this 
research, the recommendations were applied to the Marine Corps analytic wargame, 
“Operational Wargame System Game 001: Assassin’s Mace—War in the Pacific” 
(Assassin’s Mace) [75]. As part of a wargame held at the Naval Postgraduate School, 
Assassin’s Mace was amended by a wargaming team to address key issues in pursuit of a 
wargame objective. The following analysis introduces Assassin’s Mace and demonstrates 
how the wargaming methodologies were applied to this DOD analytic wargame based upon 
the previously discussed factors of the intended level of warfare evaluated and the 
information structure of the game.  
A. ASSASSIN’S MACE INTRODUCTION 
The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL) released “Assassin’s Mace” 
in 2019 in partial response to the Commandant’s Planning Guidance, published by General 
Berger, which called for “an invigorated approach to wargaming” within the Marine Corps 
[76], [77]. Specifically, MCWL developed OWS-1 as a series of games beginning with 
“Assassin’s Mace” focused on the Pacific theater [76]. This series of games is a collection 
of “table-top wargames that enable rapid player orientation and situational awareness, 
flexible execution, swift adjudication, and immersive matrixed discussions.” In short, 
Assassin’s Mace is a system wargame accessible to a variety Marine Corps Officer 
backgrounds that is both analytic and educational given its intended use of developing 
strategic thought for Officers participating in Professional Military Education [75], [76]. 






Figure 2. Operational Wargame System Game 001: Assassin’s Mace. 
Source: [75]. 
The wargame is self-described in its rules manual as a “toolkit to enable scenarios 
in the 2020 to 2030 timeframe” and “designed to support professional military education 
and to exercise joint warfighting concepts” [75]. The rules manual further describes the 
two main uses as “Professional Military Education” and “Concept and Capability 
Exploration.” The level of warfare inherent in the game pieces, adjudication, and rules are 
described in the rulebook as “high operational level” in pursuit of “strategic objectives.” In 
short, the game facilitates player exploration of concepts and capabilities at the joint 
campaign level to educate players and support “concept and future force development” 
objectives.  
The game map is specific to the western Pacific region and consists of hexagons 
aligned to cover the geographic region, national boarders, and major cities of the western 
63 
Pacific. The rulebook describes each “hex” as covering approximately 370 km by 370 km, 
and, apart from difference between land and water, “there is not an attempt to further 
identify terrain types.” Game pieces are grouped by nationality and cover a wide spectrum 
of air, land, surface, and sub-surface forces associated with conventional modern warfare 
[78]. A sampling is shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Assassin’s Mace Game Board and Pieces. Source: [76]. 
The game is turns-based, and adjudication is accomplished through the use of 
“multi-sided dice” that provide “a universal adjudication method to resolve detections, 
attacks, and [Information Operations]/Cyber effects” [78]. Modifiers such as terrain, cyber-
attacks, weather, or other forms of influence will cause the die to be “promoted” or 
“demoted” to higher- or lower-sided die to affect the likelihood of outcomes based on die-
based adjudication. Finally, cards and markers are used to modify game pieces and their 
abilities to incorporate more abstract capabilities such as information operations, cyber-
attacks, targetability, and weather effects to name a few [78]. In short, Assassin’s Mace is 
a robust and methodical system wargame well suited for the inclusion of DOD’s 
dependencies on commercial space assets. However, despite its thorough incorporation of 
terrestrial domains, there is little inclusion of space capabilities or dependencies which 
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complicated inclusion of these elements, the sum of which are detailed in the following 
section. 
B. ASSASSIN’S MACE SPACE INCORPORATION 
Assassin’s Mace has little inherent incorporation of space apart from some limited 
effects and detection considerations. However, the specific details of this limited 
representation are the starting point from which to amend the game to include commercial 
space considerations warranting a detailed review starting with its representation of the 
space domain.  
First, Assassin’s Mace only incorporates minor representations of the space domain 
and does not include space-specific assets or game mechanics. Instead, each side possesses 
a “theater ISR” capability that is proportionally sized to other nation-states represented in 
the game based upon their relative theater ISR capabilities in the western Pacific. However, 
this “theater ISR” capability is not strictly a space-based ISR capability and, instead, 
represents collective theater-wide sensing capabilities assumed to include terrestrial radars, 
satellites, and other remote sensing capabilities. Most importantly, however, is that “theater 
ISR” in the context of Assassin’s mace doesn’t explicitly represent space-based ISR 
capabilities and has limited value in educating game players about space dependencies that 
should be considered in their decision-making.  
Secondly, space effects are also underrepresented, relying primarily on cards or 
tokens to modify the effectiveness of theater ISR or communications. Specifically, “theater 







Figure 4. Assassin’s Mace “Degrade ISR” Cyber Attack Card. 
Source: [78]. 
This card can be played to reduce the effectiveness of targeted “theater ISR” 
capabilities in the game, but “theater ISR” is still generic. Moreover, these effects are 
isolated to one turn representing one day. Additionally, there is no distinction between 
commercial and national space-based ISR capabilities. Thus, space-specific effects are 
only marginally represented, and, again, provide little opportunity to educate or inform 
player decision-maker with respect to space dependencies.  
Finally, space-based communications are not explicitly represented in the game. 
Instead, communications are treated as a generic communication ability that is degraded or 
protected based on the decision to use “Comms Denial” or “Resilient Comms” tokens to 
degrade or protect a targeted unit [78]. In these instances, whether or not a unit can 
communicate is based upon the results of the die-roll adjudication method, with the sizing 
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of the dice based upon the inherent capabilities plus “Comms Denial” or “Resilient 
Comms” modifiers [78]. 
Therefore, in summary, Assassin’s Mace does not inherently incorporate space as 
either a discrete domain, set of assets, effects, or discrete capabilities. Instead, space 
considerations cannot be attacked, are constantly available, and are of sufficient bandwidth 
or capacity to meet all demands throughout the course of play [78]. However, this treatment 
of space is yet another example of a prevalent attitude that should be reconsidered in light 
of DOD’s growing space dependencies.  
C. RECOMMENDED ASSASSIN’S MACE CHANGES 
To apply the recommended wargaming methodologies, the wargame objectives and 
key issues were balanced against required changes to include commercial space to avoid 
recreating significant portions of the wargame’s design. Wargame designers should expect 
to balance a wargame’s objective and key issues against a given game design if they are 
amending a game instead of creating a new design. In this instance, Assassin’s Mace, being 
a developed and nuanced system wargame, required that the commercial space 
incorporation adjustments be made within the adjudication construct to avoid lengthy 
redevelopment requirements. Specifically, given that the wargame sponsor requested 
improvements to Assassin’s Mace to incorporate space considerations while also operating 
on a known timeline, changes that would require significant redesign were avoided while 
space incorporations that could be quickly applied were preferred. Lastly, expected player 
experience was considered to ensure incorporations of commercial space considerations 
remained accessible to a wide range of professional backgrounds while staying consistent 
with the guiding principles. Thus, considering these considerations, the following game 
changes were recommended, starting first with game construct changes. 
1. Game Construct 
Per the guiding principles and recommended methodologies, this research 
evaluated the wargame design, wargame objective, and key issues for opportunities to 
increase representation, orientation, and proliferation. The research arrived at the following 
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recommended injections to increase the wargames incorporation of DOD’s dependence 
and utilization of commercial space partners.  
a. Representation 
As previously shown, closed wargames at the strategic level with closed 
information structures are generally well suited to incorporation the largely strategic 
guiding principles. Specifically, they lend themselves to player representation of 
commercial actors with the heavily utilization of directed communication game dynamics 
to evaluate DOD’s commercial space dependencies. However, the expected number of 
players, level of warfare represented, key issues, and player experience with Assassin’s 
Mace all discouraged use of individual player presentation of commercial space actors. 
Therefore, adjusting game mechanics became the optimal choice based upon the following 
considerations, starting with the influence caused by the expected number of players. 
First, the wargame team expected that each side would be played by two or three 
players, thus making player representation of commercial space actors inappropriate and 
unbalanced considering the other combat domains were already underrepresented. Instead, 
players on each side represented task force or functional component commanders. 
Therefore, the wargame team concluded that a lack of player representation encouraged 
adjustments to adjudication and pieces.  
Secondly, this wargame addressed key issues at the operational level, and the 
gameplay remained at the “high operational” level described in the Assassin’s Mace 
rulebook. Therefore, strategic representation recommendations were not optimally suited 
for application in this instance. Specifically, the implied effects of strategic actions on the 
part of space actors, both commercial and national, were distilled down into the operational 
and tactical impacts for incorporation into the game.   
Lastly, the players participating in the wargame had very little experience with the 
space domain, space assets, or space capabilities. Therefore, they were not well equipped 
to represent commercial or national space actors in our wargame. Additionally, since the 
key issues evaluated the decision-making of terrestrial commanders, it was not 
advantageous to enforce player representation of space actors at the cost of time and effort 
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to prepare players for this role. Therefore, the wargame team determined it was best to 
apply representation techniques from the proposed methodologies that were closer to the 
tactical recommendations than the strategic recommendations. Table 12 shows the specific 
proposed “Representation” Decision Aid with the selected section used for Assassin’s 
Mace highlighted in red.  
Table 12. Representation Decision Aid—Selected Technique  
 
 
From the above Representation Decision Aid, the “Wargame System 
Representation Methods” were employed as guidance for how to adjust Assassin’s Mace 
to best represent commercial space into this wargame. Then, as shown in Table 13, the 
recommendations were evaluated within the context of the wargame objective and key 
issues to arrive at the selected incorporation methods used in Assassin’s Mace. 
Specifically, SATCOM was modeled by breaking down communication adjudication into 
traditional communications using national SATCOM systems and commercial SATCOM. 
Then, commercial SATCOM was assigned a die number that would result in successful 
communications in most instances based upon probability. However, if it was unsuccessful, 
then the command was decrypted and provided to the Red Team which is discussed in 
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detail in a later section. In this instance, the term “unsuccessful” is not used to describe 
what happened to the communication. Instead, it is used in reference to the result of the 
adjudication. The “unsuccessful” communication is specifically modeled as a 
communication that was detected by the adversary and prevented from reaching its 
intended recipient. This is not a prescriptive model, but rather a plausible example of the 
consequences of using a representative commercial SATCOM channel that transmits its 
signals with a higher degree of detection or intercept than national SATCOM systems. 
Thus, not only was space-based SATCOM incorporated, but it was separated into both 
national and commercial SATCOM for use in the wargame with implied vulnerabilities. 
Additionally, ISR was modeled by differentiating theater ISR into two forms, 
national theater ISR and commercial theater ISR. National theater ISR was treated as a 
targeted, limited-capacity capability while commercial theater ISR was treated as 
ubiquitous. Specifically, national theater ISR could only be applied to individual hexes and 
total capability was a function of how many national theater ISR cards each team 
possessed. Commercial theater ISR, was represented as a separate capability that applied 
equally across all hexes each turn as a means of representing its greater capacity and 
coverage, a trait discussed in more detail in the proliferation amendments to Assassin’s 
Mace. These results are summarized in Table 13 
Table 13. Commercial Representation—Results 
 
 
In summary, representation was accomplished for Assassin’s Mace utilizing 
adjustments to gameplay mechanics and adjudication. It required the creation of new 
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pieces, but it did not require major revisions to other game pieces, existing effects, or the 
game board. Additionally, the effects were easily understood by players with limited space 
backgrounds while also allowing freedom of decision-making by players to enable 
productive evaluation of the key issues and the wargame objective.  
b. Orientation 
Given that the wargame did not incorporate unique commercial actors, either 
through player representation or game-piece representation, player orientation was not a 
critical factor for this wargame. Specifically, player orientation is meant to enable 
productive and principled dynamics within a wargame when explicit commercial actors are 
represented. However, because this wargame represented commercial capabilities instead 
of commercial actors consistent with the tactical recommendations in the Representation 
Decision Aid, players interacted with commercial capabilities instead of commercial 
actors. Therefore, the only orientation that was completed was an introductory lesson for 
all players on current DOD reliance on commercial space partners and an introduction to 
space-based capabilities. Details were provided on the changes to adjudication and 
gameplay mechanics to inform play decision-making. This allowed the players to make 
informed choices when electing to utilize commercial ISR and commercial SATCOM over 
national systems with the intent that this context would produce results that reflected deeper 
analysis and planning on the part of the players.  
c. Proliferation 
Proliferation was first evaluated within the context of the game design and wargame 
key issues. As with representation, the wargaming team concluded Assassin’s Mace is 
better suited to model commercial ISR proliferation using the tactical recommendations 
for a closed wargame from the Commercial ISR Proliferation Decision Aid. Specifically, 
Assassin’s Mace does not have a sufficient representation of the space domain and space 
actors to incorporate interactions between strategic commanders and commercial actors as 
seen in the strategic level recommendations. Instead, a capabilities-focused approach was 
more suitable, and the tactical recommendations from the Commercial ISR Proliferation 
Decision Aid were, therefore, more applicable. However, a different conclusion was 
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reached for commercial SATCOM proliferation. Specifically, the wargaming team 
concluded that commercial SATCOM proliferation was best incorporated using the 
strategic recommendations from the Commercial SATCOM Proliferation Decision Aid. 
This selection was based on the wargame’s treatment of command and control which, at 
the “high operational” level of warfare represented in the game, is modeled as a generic 
capability instead of a combined set of radios and other communication pathways seen in 
the tactical level recommendations. Therefore, the proliferation of commercial ISR and 
SATCOM was incorporated in two ways, starting first with commercial ISR incorporation. 
First, for commercial ISR, proliferation was modeled by adjusting the relative 
capacity of commercial theater ISR to national theater ISR consistent with the tactical 
recommendations for a closed information structure wargame. Specifically, Assassin’s 
Mace models national theater ISR as a targeted capability based on the preassigned number 
of national theater ISR tokens allotted to each side at the beginning of the conflict [78]. For 
example, if the blue team is assigned three national theater ISR tokens, then those tokens 
can be “targeted” at three different hexes each turn to identify what enemy units are present 
in those three hexes. Targeting simply denotes that the ISR capability only reveals forces 
within that hex. Detection is adjudicated through the roll of dice by hex. However, the 
wargaming team modeled commercial ISR proliferation by allowing the previously 
discussed commercial theater ISR capability to be applied to all units across the entire 
gameboard at the beginning of each turn. Therefore, on each turn, adjudication was 
accomplished for all hexes and all units to reveal either blue or red forces. This represented 
the new reality that commercial remote sensing capabilities are now widely proliferated 
across the entire battlespace on a near-continuous basis consistent with the sixth guiding 
principle. Moreover, the detection of both sides’ forces each turn showed how proliferation 
does, per the guiding principles, work both for and against a commander’s security interests 
on the battlefield. The decisions for commercial ISR proliferation modeling are 
summarized in Table 14 and Table 15. 
72 
Table 14. Commercial ISR Proliferation Decision Aid—Selected Method 
 
 
Table 15. Commercial ISR Proliferation—Results 
 
 
Secondly, commercial SATCOM proliferation was modeled based upon the 
strategic recommendations for a closed information structure wargame. Specifically, these 
recommendations encourage the augmentation of command-and-control capabilities 
through the incorporation of commercial SATCOM pathways that increase the likelihood 
of successful communication. Therefore, the wargaming team amended communication 
game mechanics to allow players to use commercial SATCOM by using a “Resilient 
Commercial Comms” ability. This ability allowed players to employ commercial 
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SATCOM as a means of communication with their units in addition to a unit’s inherent 
communication ability modeled with the existing communication gameplay mechanics. 
This ability was assigned a die number that ensured communications would be successful 
most of the time based on dice adjudication. This redundant form of communication meant 
that the adversary must target both national SATCOM channels and commercial SATCOM 
channels to successfully prevent successful command-and-control. This is consistent with 
the noted diversity and proliferation of commercial SATCOM channels outlined in the 
guiding principles. A summary of this employment of the Commercial SATCOM Decision 
Aid and its resulting adjudication changes are summarized in Table 16 and Table 17. 




Table 17. Commercial SATCOM Proliferation—Results 
 
 
In summary, proliferation of commercial ISR and SATCOM was accomplished 
using both tactical and strategic recommendations. By combining these recommendations, 
the wargaming team achieved appropriate representations of commercial ISR and 
commercial SATCOM in a manner that allowed players to choose whether to rely on 
commercial space-enabled capabilities in both their reconnaissance and command-and-
control. In doing so, Assassin’s Mace was successfully modified to enable the examination 
of the key issues to achieve the wargame objective. Thus, with representation, orientation, 
and proliferation recommendations applied, the following section outlines the changes 
made to Assassin’s Mace to improve game execution.  
2. Game Execution 
As with the game structure changes, the modifications to game execution were 
derived from the wargaming methodologies to incorporate commercial space into the 
player interactions and space-related effects. 
a. Interactions 
Due to the decision to not represent commercial actors with players or tokens 
representing commercial actors, there were limited opportunities to inject DOD reliance on 
commercial space partners into game interactions. Specifically, this wargame did not allow 
opposing sides to interact with one another directly or to interact with the respective 
supporting commercial partners. This decision was made because, at the operational level 
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of warfare being represented, the wargaming team decided these interactions did not serve 
to evaluate the key issues involved. In other words, the wargame sought to identify how 
access to commercial capabilities influenced how the commander’s pursued their 
operational and strategic objectives. Therefore, the recommendation to incorporate 
changes to player interactions was not applied to Assassin’s Mace. This serves as an 
example of how choices of how to represent commercial space in the construct of a 
wargame heavily influences the applicability or suitability of the following recommended 
changes. In this instance, the choice to represent commercial capabilities instead of 
commercial entities prevented meaningful inclusion of the recommended interaction 
changes.  
b. Effects 
Finally, the wargame team incorporated the unique vulnerabilities and capabilities 
of commercial systems into game adjudication and game mechanics that enhance the value 
of the other changes in game construct. Specifically, when Assassin’s Mace and its 
amended game construct were evaluated, the representation and inclusion of proliferation 
afforded four opportunities to refine these adjustments to reflect commercial strengths and 
weaknesses more accurately. These four adjustments are derived from the recommended 
changes for a tactical, closed information structure wargame Effects Decision Aid, and are 
comprised of two changes to commercial SATCOM and two changes to commercial ISR.  
First, since commercial SATCOM was represented as another means of 
communication for units, the changes to commercial SATCOM’s relative strengths and 
weaknesses were applied to this inclusion method. Specifically, the Commercial Effects 
Decision Aid, seen in Table 18, recommends treating commercial capabilities as more 
susceptible to degradation baring any known resiliencies or hardening. 
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Table 18. Commercial Effects Decision Aid—Selected Method 
 
 
For this specific inclusion, commercial SATCOM was modeled as having two 
additional consequences: detection and potential interception. First, if commercial 
SATCOM was used to command-and-control a unit, then it was revealed to the adversary 
that a message was sent to that unit. The information of that communication was not 
revealed, but, as a representative vulnerability of using a commercial SATCOM channel, 
it was revealed that a communication was sent to that unit. Secondly, if that communication 
was adjudicated as unsuccessful, it came with the added consequence that the contents of 
the communication were revealed. If this occurred, the adversary was allowed to know 
what command was given. Of note, this drawback was not meant to imply that commercial 
systems use less encryption, but rather this drawback created risks for players when 
weighing the use of commercial SATCOM channels for command-and-control. 
Specifically, this drawback represented a generic cyber vulnerability of the commercial 
SATCOM used in this game to differentiate between the capabilities of national and 
commercial SATCOM systems. Thus, in summary, commercial SATCOM game 
mechanics were amended in two critical ways to incorporate representative vulnerabilities 
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that would reveal the underlying decision-making considerations players relied upon 
during gameplay.  
Modeling of Commercial ISR also utilized two effects-related changes to 
incorporate commercial strengths and vulnerabilities more accurately. First, commercial 
theater ISR was treated as four times more vulnerable to the cyber-attack card available to 
players in the game. Specifically, as shown in Figure 5, cyber-attacks degraded a player’s 
commercial theater ISR by eight counts while national theater ISR capabilities were only 
degraded by two counts. This change showed players that commercial services, while 
possessing more capacity and capability in some instances, may also be less resilient in a 
contested space environment.  
 
Figure 5. Cyber Attack Card Changes. Adapted from [75]. 
Lastly, commercial ISR incorporated a final sample weakness designed to 
distinguish the relative value between national theater ISR and commercial theater ISR 
products. Specifically, units detected by commercial theater ISR were not targetable once 
detected unlike units detected using national theater ISR. In other words, Assassin’s Mace 
uses a marker to identify an adversary’s units as targetable by weapon systems. This marker 
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is placed on those units detected by theater ISR in the unamended gameplay. However, the 
wargaming team elected to not assign the marker to targets detected by commercial theater 
ISR to simulate that information not being sufficiently detailed or incorporated into 
friendly targeting cycles to such a degree as to be targetable. Instead, commercial theater 
ISR could be used to cue national theater ISR or terrestrial systems that could produce 
targeting-level data. Thus, a relative weakness was injected capitalizing on the distinction 
between national and commercial theater ISR capabilities. 
Thus, in summary, effects were successfully incorporated into the wargame 
mechanics and adjudication which helped distinguish between the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of commercial SATCOM and ISR. These results are summarized in Table 19, 
and they collectively represent highly efficient amendments to Assassin’s Mace in pursuit 
of the sponsor’s key issues and wargame objective. 




In conclusion, the amendments to the sponsored Assassin’s Mace wargame 
demonstrated both the utility and limits of the proposed wargaming methodologies for the 
incorporation of DOD’s reliance on commercial space partners. In one sense, the wargame 
amendments successfully applied the recommended methodologies to Assassin’s Mace 
and enabled the evaluation of the wargame’s key issues. However, given that Assassin’s 
Mace was a robust and nuanced system wargame, amendments that were achievable on 
timeline and with the available players and resources meant that larger changes to the game 
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to better incorporate the wargaming methodologies could not be pursued. Despite these 
challenges, however, the wargaming methodologies were confirmed to offer value to game 
designers and can be successfully applied to existing DOD wargaming efforts to meet 
wargaming objectives and key issues. 
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VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION  
This research identified the guiding principles and wargaming methodologies that 
enable DOD wargaming efforts to incorporate DOD’s reliance on commercial partners 
providing SATCOM and space-based ISR. This thesis demonstrated that DOD analytical 
wargaming efforts can achieve this by applying the identified commercial paradigm and 
six guiding principles using the five recommended methods of inject. In doing so, DOD 
analytical wargames can now methodically incorporate dependencies on commercial space 
partners in a manner that is consistent with the underlying real-world dynamics and 
coordinated with concurrent DOD wargaming efforts utilizing these guiding principles and 
wargame injection methods.  
A. SUMMARY 
This, collectively, was concluded by first assessing the scope of commercial space 
capabilities, capacity, and proliferation to demonstrate that commercial space partners 
operate significant combat-relevant capabilities that meaningfully influence modern 
combat. These capabilities are of such capacity and number that, regardless of any specific 
partnerships, their inclusion into modern strategic thinking and, by extension, DOD 
wargaming, is an imperative.  
Then, the thesis reviewed specific U.S. policy and historical relations to achieve 
two distinct goals. First, these reviews established the context and existing regulatory 
framework needed to systematically characterize the dynamics that exist between the USG 
and commercial space partners. Secondly, the review of current policy and the existing 
relationship showed that current dependencies are already significant and growing, further 
emphasizing the importance of including this dependency into DOD strategic thinking and, 
necessarily, DOD wargaming efforts.  
With the regulatory context and necessity for inclusion established, this research 
then introduced the space domain and the basics of space conflict to enable a detailed 
assessment of challenges faced by commercial actors and, specifically, DOD space partners 
during times of conflict. Then, with the collective context for commercial space partners 
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during conflict established, this thesis distilled these challenges into a singular commercial 
paradigm consisting of four key considerations that commercial space partners must 
balance with their decision-making: 
1. Relations with customers  
2. Relations with regulators 
3. Current business model 
4. Future commercial viability 
Based upon the context provided by the commercial paradigm, this thesis evaluated 
how these commercial considerations could be leveraged to influence a commercial space 
partner’s ability or willingness to support the DOD either during times of conflict or in the 
future. This research then summarized the results of this analysis into a set of six guiding 
principles as follows: 
1. Assets may hold strategic value to commercial partners  
2. Market access cannot be assumed and may be leveraged 
3. Current and future profitability must be protected 
4. Stakeholders must be known and accounted for 
5. The existence of undisclosed influence must be acknowledged 
6. Proliferation complicates capability denial 
Once this research established the commercial paradigm and guiding principles, it 
then introduced the craft of wargaming and, more specifically, DOD wargaming efforts. 
Then, to ensure the recommended wargaming methods would be both broadly applicable 
and in a pertinent format, the thesis determined that the recommended incorporation 
methods should be structured for application to analytic wargames. Furthermore, based on 
the dynamics being modeled, the research concluded that wargame decision aids should 
use the spectrums of Levels of Warfare from tactical to strategic and wargame “Information 
Structure” from open to closed for framing the recommendations [71]. Then, the 
commercial paradigm and guiding principles were synthesized into recommended changes 
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to the wargame construct and gameplay mechanics. Specifically, wargames seeking to 
incorporate DOD reliance on commercial SATCOM and space-based ISR should ensure 
representation, improve player orientation, and increase relative proliferation into the game 
construct. Then, to improve the fidelity of the gameplay, wargame designs should 
incorporate the commercial paradigm and directed communications into game interactions 
between players. Moreover, wargame designs should incorporate the relative resiliencies 
and susceptibilities of commercial space assets and capabilities into their modeling of 
space-enabled capabilities.  
Finally, this thesis evaluated the effectiveness of these recommendations by 
applying them to a DOD analytic wargame, Assassin’s Mace, as part of a sponsored 
wargame conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School. This application demonstrated how 
each of the wargame inject methods could be applied to an existing DOD analytic wargame 
in pursuit of a known wargame objective with associated key issues. This process revealed 
that the developed tools are well suited for modeling DOD reliance on commercial space 
partners in analytical wargames, but many of the modeling recommendations are not easily 
applied to existing games without also requiring extensive remodeling of the space domain 
if not already included. Specifically, revising Assassin’s Mace to fully incorporate all of 
the recommended changes would have required significant revision to game pieces and 
turn mechanics. However, this degree of revision was not needed in this instance to achieve 
the sponsor’s objectives. Instead, the recommended wargame methods did allow 
substantially improved incorporation with relatively minor adjustments to the wargame 
design through the pairing of the changes with specific wargame key issues.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS  
This thesis revealed that further research is needed to standardize wargame player 
education and orientation. Specifically, topics such as the space domain, space conflict, 
satellite imaging, and SATCOM degradation may not be well understood by all wargame 
participants, especially those representing disciplines less associated with the space 
domain. Therefore, additional research is needed to refine player orientation tools so that 
all players are well equipped to participate in wargames incorporating the space domain. 
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Additionally, DOD wargaming would benefit from standardized data concerning 
commercial companies, constellations, capabilities, and capacity. This information may 
already be aggregated to some degree by some DOD wargaming efforts, but wargame 
designers and players would benefit from additional standardization of the assumptions 
made about commercial actors and their capabilities across the full spectrum of DOD 
wargaming. Therefore, if the DOD wishes to further incorporate these topics into their 
wargames while still maintaining consistency across multiple wargaming efforts, then 
more research is needed to establish baseline products for the education and orientation of 
wargame designers and players participating in such wargames.  
More research is also recommended to translate the guiding principles identified in 
this research into more service- or theater-specific considerations. Specifically, if 
wargames intend to evaluate service- or theater-specific space considerations, additional 
insights could be achieved by refining the guiding principles and wargaming 
methodologies into more service- or theater-specific tools.  
Lastly, this research constrained itself to LEO through GEO orbits. Growing 
applications of the cislunar region beyond GEO may require amendments to the proposed 
tools to account for the unique qualities of cislunar orbits.  
C. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, this research was successful in providing a framework for wargame 
designers that enables the inclusion of DOD’s dependency on commercial space partners 
into DOD wargaming efforts. This, in turn, should allow the DOD to draw more consistent 
conclusions from its wargames incorporating commercial space due to standardized 
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